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opinion in $29,000 also serves as an excellent guide for courts faced with the
argument that a warrantless search of an automobile, motor home,' 9 boat,"
or aircraft"' is valid under the fourth amendment warrant requirement.
JAmEs A. WACHTA
VI. EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
A. Erosion of the Employment-at-Will Doctrine:
Recognition of an Employee's Right to Job Security
The employment-at-will doctrine is a common law rule that holds that
any indefiniteness in the duration of an employment contract creates the
presumption that the employment arrangement is terminable at will.' The
employment-at-will doctrine permits an employer to dismiss an employee for
good cause, for no cause, and even for bad cause, free of liability for the
dismissal.2 Courts have adhered to the employment-at-will doctrine in the
109. See Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2069 (applying automobile exception to motor home).
110. See United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 24-26 (Ist Cir. 1982) (applying automobile
exception to boat), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); United States v. Weinrich, 586 F.2d 481,
492 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1978).
111. See United States v. Rollins, 699 F.2d 530, 534 (11th Cir.) (applying automobile
exception to airplane), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983); United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122,
123-26 (10th Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Worthington, 544 F.2d 1275, 1280 (5th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 817 (1977).
1. Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HAgv. L. REV. 1816, 1816-18 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Protecting At-Will Employees]. The employment-at-will doctrine relies upon the theory
that promises must be in written terms to be enforceable. Id. at 1825. The formal contract
theory underlies the argument that if the parties to a contract had intended that employment
last for a specific duration or that employment was terminable only for cause, the parties would
have set forth express provision§ in the employment contract. Id.; see Note, Tortious Interference
With Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property,
Contract and Tort, 93 HAiv. L. REv. 1510, 1529-37 (1980) (explaining evolution of formal
contract interpretation in instances of tortious interference with contractual relationship); Note,
Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 343-45 (1974) (discussing early
applications of employment-at-will doctrine) [hereinafter cited as Note, Rights to Job Security].
2. See generally, Murg and Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Over-
whelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REv. 329 (1982). The employment-at-will doctrine emerged in 1877
in a" treatise by H.G. Wood on the law of master and servant. Id. at 334-35. Prior to the
employment-at-will doctrine a presumption existed that employment contracts not specifying a
term of duration lasted for one year. Id. at 334. Nevertheless, courts readily adopted the
employment-at-will doctrine. See, e.g., Granger v. American Brewing Co., 25 Misc. 701, 703,
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belief that implying terms of duration in an employment contract ultimately
would destroy an employer's ability to regulate the size of the employer's
labor force to meet changing market requirements.' In recent years, com-
mentators have argued that the employment-at-will doctrine gives employers
too much discretion to dismiss employees, and that the doctrine strips
employees of any sense of job security.4 In response to these criticisms,
courts have begun to protect at-will employees by creating exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine.5 This article will trace the history of the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine and the justifications for the doctrine, focusing on
the exceptions to the doctrine that have evolved. Furthermore, this article
will explain the current status of the employment-at-will doctrine among the
states within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit and will suggest the most desirable direction to follow in
applying the employment-at-will doctrine to labor relationships in the future.
In 1877, H. G. Wood published A Treatise on the Law of Master and
55 N.Y.S. 695, 697 (Sup. Ct. 1899) (hiring of corporate supervisor for indefinite term at yearly
salary was terminable at election of either party); Copp v. Colorado Coal & Iron Co., 20 Misc.
702, 705, 46 N.Y.S. 542, 543 (N.Y. City Ct. 1897) (hiring of attorney at yearly rate for indefinite
term was terminable at will); Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 118, 42 N.E.
416, 417 (1895) (absent term of duration, contract for services at yearly rate was contract to
pay only for services rendered and was terminable at will of either party). The effect of the
adoption of the employment-at-will doctrine has been to minimize an employee's job security.
DeGiuseppe, The Effect of the Employment-At-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security
and Fringe Benefits, 10 FosRDiHAm URB. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1981).
3. See, e.g, Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156, 1158 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding
that employer could discharge employee despite employer's promise of permanent employment);
Hope v. National Airlines, Inc., 99 So.2d 244, 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (holding that
contract for permanent employment was unenforceable because of lack of mutuality of
obligation between parties), cert. denied, 102 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1958); Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas
Syndicate, Inc., 174 La. 66, 69, 139 So. 760, 761 (1932) (holding that because employment
contract did not bind employee, employment contract did not bind employer).
4. See generally Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employment Power, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967) (noting inadequacy
of present limitations on employer's right to dismiss and suggesting private right of action for
wrongfully discharged employees); Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A
Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law Issue in the 80's, 40 Bus. LAW 1 (1984) (reviewing
more recent court decisions that have created exceptions to employment-at-will rule and
discussing importance of implied contract and public policy theories of recovery); Peck, Unjust
Discharge from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979)
(arguing that employment-at-will doctrine violates employee's constitutional guarantees of due
process and equal protection of law); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal:
Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. Rav. 481 (1976) (explaining that statutory encroachments undercut
employment-at-will rule and made rule anachronistic); Note, Protecting At-Will Employees,
supra note 1 (stating that courts should create good faith test to replace employment-at-will
doctrine to provide employees job security).
5. See Note, Protecting At-Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1818-24 (discussing causes
of action under contract and tort theories of law available to discharged at-will employee); infra
notes 44-56 and accompanying text (explaining three general exceptions to employment-at-will
doctrine).
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Servant6 setting forth the rule that came to be known as the employment-at-
will doctrine.7 Wood asserted that hiring a servant for an indefinite period
was prima facie hiring at will." Under Wood's rule, the absence of a specific
term of employment indicated a mutual desire to retain the freedom to end
the employment relationship at any time.9 Wood provided no analysis
justifying the rule of law that he asserted.' 0 Wood simply cited four American
cases, one of which supported the employment-at-will doctrine."
The employment-at-will doctrine represented a clear departure from the
paternalism that previously characterized the employment relationship. Prior
to Wood's development of the employment-at-will doctrine, a customary
presumption dictated that an indefinite hiring was a hiring for one year.' 2
The presumption of annual employment reflected the traditional notion that
an employer was responsible for an employee's health and well-being.' 3 When
an employer dismissed an employee before the employee had finished one
year's service, the employer was liable for breach of the employment contract
even if the employment contract was silent on the duration of employment."
6. H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1st ed. 1877).
7. Id.
8. See H.G. WOOD, supra note 6, at 272. Wood contended that a servant had the burden
of establishing that his hiring was not a hiring at will. Id.
9. See id. (proposing principle that emerged later as employment-at-will doctrine); Martin
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, 417 (1895) (relying upon Wood's
rule in holding that hiring of employee was hiring at will and that employer was at liberty to
discharge at any time).
10. Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 Am. J. LEGAL. HIsT.
113, 126 (1976).
11. See Wilder v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 462, 468 (1869) (outdated contract between
Army and private entrepreneurs did not prevent entrepreneurs from making price increase for
transporting Army goods), rev'd on other grounds, 80 U.S. 254 (1871); Franklin Mining Co. v.
Harris, 24 Mich. 115, 116 (1871) (granting recovery to mining captain dismissed after only eight
months work despite assurances of job security); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56,
58 (1870) (holding that trial court did not err in permitting jury to determine nature of
employment contract from all circumstances surrounding employment relationship); DeBriar v.
Minturn, I Cal. 450, 451 (1851) (discussing right of dismissed bartender to occupy room at
tavern after receiving notification to vacate by end of month); Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 601-03, 292 N.W.2d 880, 886-87 (1980) (explaining that cases
which Wood cited did not support finding of undetermined term employment). See generally
Note, Right to Job Security, supra note 1, at 341 n.54 (explaining how four cases cited by Wood
were insufficient to uphold Wood's rule).
12. Note, Protecting At-Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1825 n.51, citing C. SMITH,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT, 53-57 (1852); see Franklin Mining Co. v.
Harris, 24 Mich. 115, 117 (1871) (holding that although miner's employment was uncertain and
was for indefinite term, jury could find that hiring was for at least one year); Davis v. Gorton,
16 N.Y. 255, 257 (1857) (holding that presumption of one-year employment applied to employees
managing farm). The presumption of a one-year employment contract applied to all employ-
ment relationships in the absence of proof that the parties intended otherwise. P. SELZNICK,
LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE, 129 (1969).
13. See 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, 253-66 (rev. ed. 1896) (employer
had duty to furnish employee with security, food, and shelter).
14. See Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 128, 26 N.E. 143, 145 (1891) (holding that
1986]
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Even when economic setbacks had forced an employer to lay off an employee,
the courts held the employer liable for payment of the remainder of the
employee's annual salary.
5
Despite the inconsistency of the employment-at-will doctrine with tradi-
tional concepts regarding employment contracts, changes in economic reali-
ties and in contract law during the late nineteenth century permitted a nearly
universal adoption of the employment-at-will doctrine. 6 The United States
saw a period of great industrialization during the late nineteenth century.
7
The economy began to place a premium on an employer's flexibility in
responding to fluctuating market demands, which included power to regulate
the size of an employer's labor force to meet changing production needs.'"
Traditional notions of paternalism, however, interfered with an employer's
autonomy by forcing an employer to retain an employee for a one year
period despite a reduced demand for the employee's labor.' 9 In contrast,
under the employment-at-will doctrine, an employer readily could reduce the
size of the employer's labor force if necessary to meet reduced market
demands.2 0 The employment-at-will doctrine permitted employers greater
flexibility in dealing with labor and, therefore, provided economic advantages
to employers.
21
when employer hired employee without mentioning time and frequency of payment, duration
of employment was one year); Huntingdon v. Claffin, 38 N.Y. 182, 182 (1868) (holding
that when employee continued employment after term of original contract had expired,
employment relationship was enforceable for additional year); New Hampshire Iron Factory
Co. v. Gonas Richardson, 5 N.H. 294, 296 (1830) (same); see also Feinman, supra note 10, at
119-20 (noting that employer could not discharge employee except for good cause).
15. See Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at 332 (noting that courts usually did not
consider employer's lack of business to be good cause for employee's discharge); Feinman,
supra note 10, at 119-20 (same).
16. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (describing influence of industrialization
on employment relationship during late nineteenth century); infra notes 23-24 and accompanying
text (explaining development of formal contract doctrine in context of employment relationship).
17. See N. WARE, THE LABOR MOVEMENT N THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1895, 65-72 (1929)
(tracing changes in labor practices in United States during development of industrial economy
in late nineteenth century). One population census indicates that between 1880 and 1890 the
number of Americans living in cities grew by 56 1/2 percent. EAsTERLIN, POPULATION, LABOR
FORCE, AND LONG SwnGs IN ECONOICC GROWTH, 192 (1968). The employment relationship
during the early nineteenth century was typically a single employer-employee arrangement. Id.
at 334 n.22. Servants often learned trade skills in the master's home. Id. With the advent of
the industrialization of the nineteenth century, close interpersonal relationships between masters
and servants began to erode as employers employed an increasing number of workers at jobs
requiring fewer skills. Id. See generally Feinman, supra note 10, at 118-23 (discussing change
that industrialization of economy brought to employment relationship); Note, Protecting At-
Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1824-25 (same).
18. See Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at 335-36 (explaining economic advantage to
employer who could discharge unneeded labor when necessary).
19. See supra note 12 (citing cases holding in favor of presumption of one year employ-
ment).
20. See G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRuP, ECONOMICS OF LABOR RELATIONS 227-316 (7th ed.
1973) (under employment-at-will doctrine, employer could hire and fire as he saw fit without
fear of lawsuits).
21. See, e.g., Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156, 1158 (1982) (holding that employer
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The application of formal contract principles to the employment rela-
tionship also influenced the adoption of the employment-at-will doctrine. In
response to the need for greater flexibility in regulating labor, courts began
to enforce only contracts that the employer expressly made, ruling that mere
labor for pay was not sufficient consideration to uphold an employment
contract. 22 Additionally, under the concept of mutuality of obligation, courts
held that when an employee made no promise to work for a fixed term,
courts would not enforce an employer's promise to retain an employee for
a specified term. 2
A series of cases in New York were also instrumental in the general
adoption of the employment-at-will doctrine. 24 For example, in Martin v.
could discharge employee despite employer's promise to employee of permanent employment);
Title Insurance Co. of Richmond v. Howell, 158 Va. 713, 717-18, 164 S.E. 387, 389 (1932)
(holding that employer had no duty to retain employee for remainder of month simply because
employee received salary on monthly basis); Washington, B. & A.R.R. Co. v. Moss, 127 Md.
12,-., 96 A. 273, 276 (1915) (holding that while employer obtained valuable benefit from
employee after promising employee permanent employment, court would not obligate employer
to retain employee); see Comment, Employment at Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BuFFALo
L. REV. 211, 212-16 (1973) (explaining employer's absolute power to discharge under employ-
ment-at-will doctrine) [hereinafter cited as Employment at Will and the Law of Contracts];
Comment, McKinney v. National Dairy Council: The Employee At Will Relationship in
Massachusetts, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 285, 286-88 (1980-81) (same); Vernon and Gray,
Termination at Will-The Employer's Right to Fire, 6 EuP. REL. L.J. 25, 26-27 (1980) (same).
22. See Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 689, 273 N.W. 315, 317 (1937) (holding
that contract for permanent employment, without some consideration in addition to employee's
obligation to work and employer's obligation to pay wages, is terminable at pleasure of either
party); see also Note, Protecting At-Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1825-26 (explaining how
emerging theory of formal contract doctrine effected drastic minimization of employer's
responsibilities to employee). During the late nineteenth century, courts adopted a one sided
approach to the consideration doctrine. Note, Protecting At-Will Employees, supra note 1, at
1819. Courts ruled that an employee's labor ensured an employee only of a wage. Id. Without
judicially recognized or otherwise identifiable additional considerations, such as foregoing
personal injury claims or contributing financially to an employer's business, an employee was
unable to enforce an employer's promises of job security. Note, Rights to Job Security, supra
note 1, at 351-56. But see A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 684, at 229 (rev. ed. 1960) (explaining that
employees should not have to furnish additional consideration to enforce promise of job
security); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81 (Tent. Draft. No. 2, 1965) (explaining
that while parties must satisfy requirement of consideration, no rule requires that promises
exchanged be equivalent in value).
23. See Murg & Scharman, supra note 2, at 336-37. Mutuality of obligation requires that
every party to a contract have a duty to perform some promise under the contract. Id. Courts
refuse to force an employee to keep his promise to work for a specific length of time because
forcing an employee to remain at his job would violate the thirteenth amendment's prohibition
against involuntary servitude. Id.; cf. Note, Protecting At-Will Employees, supra note 1, at
1819 (under mutuality doctrine, absent employee's promise to work, employer may terminate
at will).
24. See Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 1908) (holding
that employment contract, which was indefinite respecting term and which had no term fixed
by statute or custom, was terminable at will); Sumners Phenix Ins. Co., 50 Misc. 181, 182, 98
N.Y.S. 226, 228 (Sup. Ct. 1906) (employment with yearly salary, absent express term of
duration, was indefinite hiring and was terminable at any time by either party). Granger v.
American Brewing Co., 25 Misc. 701, 703, 55 N.Y.S. 695, 697 (Sup. Ct. 1899) (hiring of
1986]
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New York Life Insurance CO., 2 5 the New York Court of Appeals held that
an annual salary term in an employment contract would no longer result
automatically in a presumption that the period of employment was for a full
year.26 The Martin court declared that measuring compensation by the day,
month, or year did not prevent an employer from terminating an employment
relationship when no explicit provision specified the duration of employment.
27
The Martin court reasoned simply that Wood's rule reflected the present con-
dition of the legal effect of a general hiring and, thus, would be controlling
in the case. 28 Following the example of the Martin court, the United States
Supreme Court in Adair v. United States2 9 and in Coppage v. Kansas" declared
that courts could not compel any individual to accept or retain the personal
services of another when the parties had not bargained for a specific term
of employment. 3' In both Adair and Coppage the Court reasoned that any
corporate supervisor at yearly salary, absent express term of duration, was terminable at election
of either party); Copp v. Colorado Coal & Iron Co., 20 Misc. 702, 705, 46 N.Y.S. 542, 543
(N.Y. City Ct. 1897) (hiring of attorney at yearly rate was no more than indefinite hiring and
was terminable at will of employer); Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42
N.E. 416, 417 (1895) (contract for services at yearly rate, absent express term of duration, was
contract to pay only for rendered services and was terminable at will of either party).
25. 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
26. See id. at 121, 42 N.E. at 417. The employee in Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co.
managed the employer's real estate department at an annual salary of $10,000. Id. The employee
alleged that the $10,000 annual salary constituted an employment contract on a yearly basis.
Id. The employee contended that because the employer in Martin discharged the employee prior
to the end of the alleged contractual term, the employer was liable to the employee for the
remainder of the employee's yearly salary. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. The first courts to adopt the employment-at-will doctrine merely cited the
Wood rule or cases that cited the Wood rule; see, e.g., Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163
F.423, 425-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1908) (using employment-at-will rule to support denial of recovery to
discharged employee); Harrod v. Wineman, 146 Iowa 718, 125 N.W. 812, 813 (1910) (same);
Geer v. Arlington Mills Mfg. Co., 17 Del. 581,-., 43 A. 609, 610-13 (Super Ct. 1899) (same);
see also supra notes 6 & 8 and accompanying text (discussing assertion of employment-at-will
rule). See generally, Note, Rights to Job Security, supra note I, at 342-43 (discussing lack of
analysis in early court decisions that adopted employment-at-will doctrine).
29. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In Adair v. United States, the employer discharged an employee
because the employee was a member of a labor organization. Id. at 170. The employee contended
that the discharge violated a federal statute, known as the Erdman Act, which barred a common
carrier from discharging an employee due to the employee's union membership. Id. The United
States Supreme Court denied recovery to the employee, and the Court struck down the Erdman
Act, ruling that the Act restricted parties' freedom to contract. Id. at 180, citing Erdman Act
of June 1, 1898, ch. 370, § 10, 30 Stat. 424, 428.
30. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). In Coppage v. Kansas, the employer discharged an employee for
refusing to sign a document that stated that the employee agreed to withdraw from a labor
union. Id. at 7. The employee contended that Kansas statutory law forbade the use of contracts
that required as a condition of employment that employees not join a labor organization. Id.
at 6. The United States Supreme Court held that the employee had no cause of action and
struck down the statute in question as unconstitutional. Id. at 26-27.
31. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. at 174 (supporting principles favoring employer's
freedom to contract); Coppage, 236 U.S. at 10-11 (citing provisions of Adair supporting
argument against arbitrary interference with employer's liberty to contract).
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regulation of an employment relationship interfered with the parties' freedom
to contract.
32
The validity of the policies supporting the employment-at-will doctrine
remained unchallenged until the 1930's when federal and state courts and
legislatures began to limit the employment-at-will doctrine.3 3 In NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,34 the United States Supreme Court held that
an employer could not discharge an employee merely because the employee
belonged to a labor organization. 31 The Court recognized that, due to the
dramatic differences in bargaining leverage between employers and employ-
ees, an employee's freedom to contract did not provide enough protection
from wrongful discharge.3 6 The Court reasoned that since employees could
not obtain fair treatment from employers, the Court had a duty to aid
employees by placing restrictions on an employer's right to discharge.37
In addition to judicial erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine, federal
and state legislatures also expressed a willingness to limit the application of
the employment-at-will doctrine. During the 1930's, legislators enacted public
regulations designed primarily to prevent unjust terminations.38 Federal
regulation of the employment relationship began with the inception of the
National Labor Relations Act, 39 which formed the theoretical framework for
the more recent Fair Labor Standards Act, 40 the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970,'4 and various other statutes protecting employees from
32. See Adair, 208 U.S. at 174 (arguing that employer and employee have complete
freedom of contract); Coppage, 236 U.S. at 10-11 (same).
33. See Note, Protecting At-Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1826-28 (discussing judicial
and legislative repudiation and modification of concepts supporting employment-at-will doc-
trine); supra notes 39-48 (same).
34. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
35. See id. at 33-34 (explaining that coercion and discrimination that interferes with
employees' exercise of right to unionize is subject to condemnation by legislation). In NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., an employer dismissed employees due to the employees' union
activity. Id. at 29. The United States Supreme Court stated that the National Labor Relations
Act prohibited employers form interfering with an employee's rights to self-organization and
representation. Id. at 45-46, citing National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C,
§§ 151-166 (1985). The Court concluded that the employer violated the National Labor Relations
Act by discharging the employees, and ordered the employer to reinstate the discharged
employees and compensate them for lost wages. Id. at 48.
36. See id. at 33 (explaining that overbundance of employees resulted in unequal bargaining
power between employers and employees).
37. Id. at 43-44.
38. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 2, at 16. The various statutory limitations placed on the
employment-at-will rule have destroyed the belief that freedom of contract principles justify an
employer's absolute right to discharge an at-will employee with or without cause at any time.
Id.
39. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1982)
(promoting unionization as countervailing measure against employer control and power over
labor).
40. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982) (preventing
employer from discharging employee who has filed claims or has initiated proceedings under
Fair Labor Standards Act).
41. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
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unjust terminations. 42 The goal of federal labor regulation has been to
provide employees with at least some measure of job security by limiting an
employer's discretion t'n discharge employees.
4 3
The judicial and legislative activity regarding the employment relationship
led to the creation of three general exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine. 44 The most widely recognized of these exceptions establishes a tort
action for wrongful discharge. 4s The tort of wrongful discharge provides a
remedy to an employee discharged for engaging in activities protected by
public policy.4 6 The public policy exception to the employment-at-will doc-
(codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42, 49 U.S.C.) (1982) (preventing discrimination
against employee who has exercised rights provided under Occupational Safety and Health Act).
42. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-
187 (1982) (promoting unionization as countervailing measure against employer control and
power over labor); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to 2000e-17
(1982) (prohibiting discriminatory discharge based upon race, religion, color, sex, or national
origin); Age and Discrimination in Employment Act of i967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982) (pro-
hibiting discriminatory discharge of older workers); Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-508, 88 Stat. 1578 (codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C. and
in 50 U.S.C. § 459) (restoring returning veterans to former employment and prohibiting employers
from dismissing veterans for one year).
While many state statutes contain provisions similar to the above statutes, some states
have expanded their protections to prohibit discharge for a variety of other protected activities.
See D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-803 (1981) (prohibiting termination for failure to take lie detector
test); MICH. Comp. LAws § 418.125 (1985) (prohibiting discharge for filing claims for work-
men's compensation).
43. See Protecting At-Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1827 (discussing multiple aims of
public regulation of employment relationship).
44. See infra notes 45-56 and accompanying text (setting forth common exceptions to
employment-at-will doctrine). Today, courts in three-fifth's of the states have created some type
of action for wrongful discharge. Lopatka, supra note 4, at 1. While courts have begun to
grant exceptions to the employment-at-will rule, courts have refused to grant an exception to the
employment-at-will rule when express statutory remedies provide an alternative measure of
protection to a wrongfully discharged at-will employee. See Murg & Scharman, supra note 2,
at 352-54. Courts believe that granting exceptions to the employment-at-will rule when no express
statutory remedies are available to the employee would circumvent legislative policy. Murg &
Scharman, supra note 2, at 354; see Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910, 912
(E.D. Mich. 1977) (court refusing to grant recovery to employee under public policy exception
to employment-at-will rule when statutory remedies already protect employee from discharge
on basis of age or sex), modified, 456 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Mich. 1978); see also Wehr v.
Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (court holding that when private
cause of action would conflict with express statutory enforcement provisions, court would not
grant independent remedy to employee alleging wrongful discharge), aff'd, 619 F.2d 276 (3d
Cir. 1979).
45. See Abramson & Silvestri, Recognition of a Cause of Action for Abusive Discharge
in Maryland, 10 U. BALT. L. REv. 257, 263 (1981) (explaining that tort cause of action for
wrongful discharge is most limited intrusion upon scope of employment-at-will rule).
46. See Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1822-24. The public policy
exception exists to prevent employers from discharging employees in violation of the public
policy of the state. Id. Under the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule, the
key to an employee's claim in wrongful discharge cases is the appropriate definition of public
policy that an employer allegedly has violated. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text
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trine began as a narrow rule allowing an employee to sue an employer when
a statute expressly prohibited the employee's dismissal.4 7 The public policy
exception then expanded to provide a cause of action when a dismissal was
inconsistent with a statutory expression of public policy.48 Today, courts
occasionally permit recovery under the public policy exception even when a
statute does not embody the contravened public policy.
4 9
The second general exception to the employment-at-will doctrine permits
an employee to rebut the presumption that an indefinite hiring is terminable
at will by showing reliance on an implied-in-fact promise that limits the
employer's right of discharge. 0 Under the implied-in-fact promise exception,
(describing how scope of public policy exception to employment-at-will rule differs among
jurisdictions).
47. See Kouff v. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, 90 Cal. App.2d 322, 323, 202 P.2d 1059,
1061 (1949) (permitting wrongful discharge suit when statute prohibited employer from discharg-
ing employee who served as election officer); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171,
175, 319 A.2d 174, 178-79 (1974) (in absence of statute prohibiting employee's discharge, court
denied relief when employer discharged employee for reporting to superiors potential product
defects in employer's product).
48. See Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App.2d 184, 188-89, 344 P.2d 25,
27 (1959). In Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, the employer directed the plaintiff employee
to give false testimony during a legislative hearing. Id. The employee refused to give false
testimony, which resulted in the employee's dismissal. Id. While no statute prohibited the
employee's discharge, the California Court of Appeals permitted the employee's claim against
the employer for wrongful discharge. Id.
Some courts have refused to permit even a narrow public policy exception to the
employment-at-will rule despite cases with pronounced public overtones. See, e.g, Percival v.
General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976) (in absence of statute prohibiting
discharge, court denied recovery when employer allegedly discharged employee for disagreeing
with misrepresentation that employer made to federal government). Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 88 Cal. App.3d 646, 646, 152 Cal. Rptr., 54-55 (1979) (court denying relief when employer
allegedly discharged employee for refusing to engage in price-fixing scheme, because no statute
prohibited employee's discharge); Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So.2d 1130, 1132 (Ala.
1977) (court denying recovery when employer allegedly discharged employee for refusing to
falsify medical records because no statute prevented employee's discharge).
49. See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210,-., 536 P.2d 512, 516-17 (1975) (despite absence
of statute prohibiting discharge, cause of action available when employee's dismissal results
from being away from work to serve on jury). One court has held an employer liable for
discharging an employee who refused to have a romantic relationship with the employee's
foreman. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974). In
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that a discharge
motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the public's best interest. Id.
50. See Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713
(1979). In Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., the employer induced the employee to give
up former employment and lifetime pension opportunities, assuring the employee that the
employee would become a union member and that the employer would not fire the employee
except for good cause. Id. at 262, 283 N.W.2d at 717. Despite the oral assurance of job security
that the employer extended to the employee, the employer subsequently discharged the employee
without cause. Id. at 263, 283 N.W.2d at 717-18. The Michigan Court of Appeals stated that
an exception to the employment-at-will rule exists when an employee relinquishes employment
under assurances of a permanent position at a new job. Id. at 259, 283 N.W.2d at 716; see also
O'Neill v. ARA Servs., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 182, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (allowing cause of action
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courts consider the circumstances surrounding an employment relationship
to determine whether an employer has made implied promises concerning
job security or procedures for discharge'.5 Courts usually have declined to
find that employer assurances of job security constitute enforceable promises,
even when detrimental reliance occurs and when employee handbooks or
manuals extend the employer's assurances.
52
The third general exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, which
courts rarely apply, limits an employer's discretion in dismissing an employee
by implying in the employment contract a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.53 Under the good faith exception, discharge without good cause
to discharged employee who had begun employment in reliance upon promises of promotion);
Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App.2d 98,-, 291 P.2d 91, 94 (1955)
(employee's reliance upon employer's inducements to remain at job constituted sufficient
consideration to render employment contract enforceable).
51. See Grauer v. Valve & Primer Corp., 47 Ill. App.3d 152, 154-55, 361 N.E.2d 863,
865-66 (1977) (court holding that letter to employee from employer furnished implied promise
of annual employment).
52. See Note, Protecting At- Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1820-21 (explaining custom-
ary inclination to disregard personnel handbooks and manuals as creating enforceable promises);
Neth v. General Elec. Co., 65 Wash.2d 652,-., 399 P.2d 314, 319 (1965) (court declined to
enforce promises that employer made during union election campaign, finding that employer's
representations were no more than opinions); Cederstrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 263 Minn.
520,-., 117 N.W.2d 213, 222-23 (1962) (court refused to hold that written policy of
corporation to dismiss only for good cause constituted offer of continued employment).
Although courts traditionally have refused to enforce promises of continued employment
contained in personnel policy manuals, some courts recently have decided to enforce these
promises. In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., for example, the employer made
oral promises to the employee during the employment interview that the employer would not
discharge the employee unless the employee failed to perform employment duties. Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 614-15, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980). The
employer's company manual also implied that the employer would not discharge employees
without good cause. Id. at 597-98, 292 N.W.2d at 884. The Michigan Supreme Court held that
the oral and written statements of the employer created an enforceable contractual provision
necessitating good cause for dismissal. Id. at 614-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892. The court reasoned
that the promises, both written and oral, were inducements to employment. Id. The court found
that the employer's promises constituted part of the employment that the employee accepted.
Id.; see Murg & Scharman, supra note. 2, at 367-72 (minority of courts beginning to adopt view
that courts can enforce promises of continued employment appearing in employee manuals and
handbooks).
53. See Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, 553 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding
that employer's discharge of employee was malicious and, therefore, constituted breach of
employment contract under New Hampshire law); Zimmer v. Wells Management Corp., 348 F.
Supp. 540, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (employer had obligation to act in good faith with employee
in reaching decision whether to continue employment contract). Much litigation has arisen
concerning whether an employer had the good cause necessary to discharge an employee under
the good faith exception. See Comment, Employment at Will And The Law of Contracts, supra
note 21, at 229. Whether an employer has good cause to discharge an employee is a question
of fact for a jury. Ward v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 480 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972). One court has determined that an employer has good cause to discharge when an
employee fails to perform employment duties in the same manner as would a person of ordinary
reason under the same or similar circumstances. Ingram v. Dallas County Water Control &
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breaches a covenant of good faith and, thus, is wrongful.5 4 Courts have
given a great deal of consideration to.whether a duty to terminate for good
cause applies only to at-will employment and generally have declined to
imply that duty when no provisions express a specific term of employment."s
Courts have explained that implying a duty to terminate only in good faith
would unduly infringe upon an employer's discretion to discharge employ-
ees.
5 6
While numerous exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine have
emerged, until recently the courts in Virginia have been reluctant to declare
any significant exceptions to the employment-at-will rule.5 7 Virginia adopted
the employment-at-will rule during the early twentieth century.58 Title Insur-
Improvement Dist. No. 7, 425 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). Inefficiency and
dishonesty of the employee, as well as the employee's failure to perform any of his customary
duties, constitutes good cause for the employee's dismissal. See Comment, Employment At Will
And the Law of Contracts, supra note 21, at 229.
54. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 2, at 24. The New Hampshire Supreme Court was the
first court to impose the good faith exception to the employment-at-will rule. Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130,-, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974). In Monge, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court stated that a good faith requirement for dismissal was necessary because an
unrestricted right to dismiss employees interfered with the policy of fostering improved labor
relations. Id. Other jurisdictions, such as California and Massachusetts, also have recognized a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts. See Pugh v. See's Candies,
Inc., 116 Cal. App.3d 311, 313, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 919-20 (1981). In Pugh v. See's Candies,
Inc., the employer allegedly discharged the employee because the employee opposed negotiation
of a sweetheart contract between the employer's company and a labor organization. Id. at 313,
171 Cal. Rptr. at 919-20. The California Appellate Court in Pugh found that the employee had
stated a cause of action, looking at the totality of circumstances of the employment relationship.
Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927. The Pugh court declared that the fact that the employee had
worked for thirty-two years, the absence of any criticism of the employee's work, and the
assurances of job security which the employee received from the employer gave rise to an
implied covenant that the employer would discharge employees only in good faith. Id. Thus,
the Pugh court held that the employer had the burden of proving good cause to discharge the
employee. Id.; see also Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 104, 364 N.E.2d
1251, 1256 (1977) (court held that employment contract imposed upon employer duty to
discharge in good faith). See generally DeGiuseppe, supra note 2, at 24-30 (explaining adoption
and development of good faith exception to employment-at-will rule).
55. See Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 226-27, 685 P.2d 1081, 1086
(1984) (no good faith limitation on discharge); Parner v. Americana Hotels, 65 Hawaii 370, 372,
652 P.2d 625, 629 (1982) (same); Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699,
703 (1980) (same).
56. See Daniel, 127 Ariz. at......_, 620 P.2d at 703 (1980) (stating that courts should not
interfere with employee dismissals to extent that courts become arbiters of any discharge that
has tinge of bad faith); Parner, 65 Hawaii at 377, 652 P.2d at 629 (1982) (stating that protection
of employee does not include intrusion on employer's right to discharge that would result from
implying duty to terminate only in good faith).
57. See infra notes 72-101 (discussing status of employment-at-will doctrine in Virginia).
58. See Conrad v. Ellison-Harvey Co., 120 Va. 458, 466, 91 S.E. 763, 766 (1917) (holding
that indefinite employment was employment-at-will and was terminable at will of either party);
Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 106 Va. 223, 226, 55 S.E. 551, 552 (1906)
(same); see also Warden v. Hines, 163 F. 201, 203 (1908) (same); The Pokanoket, 156 F. 241,
243 (1907) (same).
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ance Co. of Richmond v. Howell was typical of the Virginia Supreme Court's
early treatment of the doctrine.5 9 In Howell, the employer allegedly dis-
charged the employee in breach of a monthly employment contract.
60 The
Virginia Supreme Court found that an employment contract was terminable
at will if the contract simply provided for a monthly rate of pay and did not
mention the duration of employment. 6' The court noted that when a breach
of an employment contract occurs, the language of the contract alone
determines the rights of the parties under the contract. 62 The court held that
when no contractual language furnished the means of determining the
duration of a contract, the court would not add terms which the parties did
not incorporate into the employment contract.
63
The law of employment-at-will in Virginia has changed very little since
the doctrine's early adoption by the Virginia Supreme Court. 64 In Virginia,
when an employment contract does not specify that the employment is
terminable only for cause or that the employment will endure for a specific
duration, courts apply a rebuttable presumption of at-will employment. 65 In
determining whether an employee has rebutted the presumption of at-will
59. 158 Va. 713, 164 S.E. 387 (1932).
60. See id. at 716, 164 S.E. at 388-89. In Title Insurance Co. of Richmond v. Howell,
the employer agreed in a written contract to pay the employee at a rate of $708.34 per month
for the employee's services as an expert title examiner. Id. The employee contended that an
additional oral understanding between the parties specified that the employer would pay the
employee on a monthly basis and that the employer would give the employee thirty days notice
prior to termination of the employment contract. Id. at 717, 164 S.E. at 389. The employee
argued that the oral understanding between the parties constituted a contract for monthly
employment. Id.
61. See id. at 717-18, 164 S.E. at 389. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Howell
stated that the employee had made no claim that would create an enforceable contract for
monthly employment. Id. at 718, 164 S.E. at 389.
62. Id. at 718, 164 S.E. at 389.
63. Id.
64. See Plaskitt v. Black Diamond Trailer Co., 209 Va. 460, 468, 164 S.E.2d 645, 651
(1968) (court citing Stonega, a 1906 Virginia case, in support of refusal to grant exception to
employment-at-will doctrine); Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 106 Va. 223,
226, 55 S.E. 551, 552 (1906) (holding that indefinite employment was terminable at will of
either party); see also Wards Co. v. Lewis & Dobrow, Inc., 210 Va. 751, 756, 173 S.E.2d 861,
865 (1970) (court refusing to grant recovery to discharged at-will employee); Hoffman Speciality
Co. v. Pelouze, 158 Va. 586, 594, 164 S.E. 397, 399 (1932) (court refusing to controvert settled
doctrine that when no specific term determines duration of employment, presumption attaches that
employment was terminable at-will); Title Insurance Co. v. Howell, 158 Va. 713, 718, 164 S.E.
387, 389 (1932) (court declaring that in United States, contract of employment for indefinite
period was terminable at will of either party).
65. See Boyette, Terminating Employees in Virginia: A Roadmap for the Employer,
Employee, and their Counsel, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 747, 749-54 (1983). The employee can rebut
the presumption of at-will employment by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employment is terminable only for cause. Id. at 755-56. When an employee violates the terms
of his employment contract or the employer's reasonable rules, regulations, or policies, the
employer may have adequate grounds to discharge the employee. Id. at 750-51. Incapacity or
disability or failure to perform in a reasonably skillful manner also may constitute cause for
discharge. Id. at 751-53.
[Vol. 43:431
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
employment, Virginia courts have considered the intent of the parties, judging
from the parties' written and oral agreements, the usual practices of an
employer's business, and the nature of the employment.6 6 Employees in
Virginia sometimes have succeeded at rebutting the presumption of at-will
employment. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court has held that an
employer's offer of severance pay to procure an employee's resignation
negates the presumption of at-will employment. 67 The court has explained
simply that offering severance pay upon discharge of an employee is an act
that is inconsistent with rights of parties under contracts for employment of
indefinite duration.6 8 While a good faith requirement has emerged to offer
increased protection to at-will employees, Virginia has not yet recognized
this requirement.
69
Despite Virginia's reluctance to limit the employment-at-will doctrine
using modern contract theory, the Virginia Supreme Court has limited the
doctrine by recognizing that a cause of action in tort exists when a termination
is in violation of public policy7
°
In Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville 7 1 two discharged employees
brought an action against their employer, alleging improper discharge and
tortious interference with the employees' respective employment contracts. 72
The employer had warned the two employees, who were shareholders of the
employer's corporation, that the employees would lose their jobs if the
employees did not vote in favor of a proposed merger.7 3 The employees
voted in favor of the merger, but subsequently informed the employer that
the employees' votes were void.7 4 Shortly thereafter, the employer fired the
66. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing example of employee attempt to
rebut presumption of at-will employment).
67. See Hoffman v. Pelouze, 158 Va. 586, 594-95, 164 S.E. 397, 400 (1932). In Hoffman
v. Pelouze, the discharged employee alleged that he had had a one-year contract that was
renewable from year to year. Id. at 588-89, 164 S.E. at 397. Because the parties had executed
no contract that specified the duration of employment, the Virginia Supreme Court initially
applied a presumption of at-will employment. Id. The court, however, found that the employer's
offer of severance pay together with the employer's letter referring to the employee's annual
pay negated the presumption of at-will employment. Id. at 594-95, 164 S.E. at 400. Thus, the
Virginia Supreme Court upheld the jury verdict that no at-will employment contract existed.
Id.
68. Id.
69. Boyette, supra note 65, at 760; see Fisher v. Southern Oxygen & Supply Co., Civil
Action No. 82-0912-R (E.D. .Va. Sept. 26, 1983). In Fisher v. Southern Oxygen & Supply Co.,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled that Virginia had not
yet recognized an implied duty to discharge for good cause only. See Fisher, Civil Action No.
82-0912-R at 2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 26, 1983). The Fisher court indicated that Virginia would not
recognize such an implied duty because Virginia has regarded contracts of indefinite duration
as contracts of hazard. Id.
70. See infra note 80 and accompanying text (noting Virginia's recently recognized public
policy exception to employment-at-will rule).
71. 229 Va., 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
72. Id. at____., 331 S.E.2d at 800.
73. Id. at______, 331 S.E.2d at 799.
74. Id. The employees in Bowman executed proxy cards in favor of the merger for fear
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two employees. 7 The Virginia Supreme Court found that section 13.1-32 of
the Virginia Code, 76 which entitles a shareholder the right to vote, conferred
upon the employees the right to vote their shares free of duress and without
fear of reprisal from corporate management. 77 The Bowman court stated
that the Virginia General Assembly intended section 13.1-32 of the Virginia
Code to further the public policy of free exercise of corporate voting rights.
78
The court ruled that the employer could not lawfully threaten discharge in
response to the employees' exercise of their voting rights, for such a threat
would violate the public policy of ensuring a shareholder's unfettered discre-
tion to vote his shares freely. 79
While Bowman signals Virginia's recognition of a cause of action when
dismissal violates a specific public policy, the scope of a cause of action
based on a public policy may be rather narrow. 0 The Bowman court indicated
that the employer's threat and subsequent discharge of the employees were
unlawful only because the employer's acts violated the established policy of
section 13.1-32 of the Virginia Code.81 The Bowman court's holding, there-
fore, implies that the Virginia courts will recognize a wrongful discharge
action only when the discharge violates the public policy underlying an
existing statute.
82
Although the public policy exception imposed upon the employment-at-will
doctrine in Bowman is rather narrow, the exception is not unlike limitations
placed upon the doctrine by the Virginia legislature. 83 The Virginia legislature
has provided that a discharged employee may sue his employer when the
discharge results from the employee's exercise of rights under the safety and
health laws84 or the Workman's Compensation Act,8" or when the discharge
that the employer would discharge the employees. Id. The merger proposal passed as a result
of the two employees voting in favor of the merger. Id. After the employees informed the
employer that the employees' votes were void, the employer aborted the plans for a merger. Id.
75. Id.
76. VA. CODE ANN4. § 13.1-32 (1984 & Supp. 1985) (stating that each share of stock
entitled holder to one vote on every matter that meeting of stockholders considers).
77. Bowman, 229 Va. at ., 331 S.E.2d at 801.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at.., 331 S.E.2d at 801. The Virginia Supreme Court stated that it was
applying a narrow exception to the employment-at-will rule. Id. The Bowman court indicated
that, while the court was not altering the traditional rule of employment-at-will, the court
recognized that the employment-at-will rule was not absolute. Id. The court stated that the
unique facts of the case required the court to apply the public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine. Id.
81. Id. at-...._, 331 S.E.2d at 801.
82. See supra text accompanying note 81 (explaining narrow basis upon which Bowman
court created public policy exception). Having created a very narrow exception to the employ-
ment-at-will rule, the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Bowman will not remedy violations
of judicially defined policies.
83. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (citing statutory restrictions that Virginia
legislature has placed upon employer's power to discharge employee).
84. See VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-52.2:1 (1981) (providing that no person shall dismiss or
discriminate against employees exercising rights under Virginia safety and health laws).
85. See id. § 65.1-40.1 (1980 & Supp. 1985) (providing that no person shall dismiss
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violates certain other statutes. s6 Furthermore, the Bowman decision finds
support among numerous jurisdictions that have adopted a similar public
policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
8 7
In Maryland, courts long have adhered to the rule that an employment
contract of indefinite duration is terminable at the pleasure of either party
at any time."' Since the adoption of the employment-at-will rule in Maryland,
courts have carved out few exceptions to the rule.89 Courts applying Maryland
law have recognized a limited exception to the employment-at-will rule when
employees provide consideration in addition to their services. 9 For example,
the Maryland courts have granted an exception to the employment-at-will
rule when an employee relinquishes a personal injury claim in exchange for
an employer's promise of a lifetime job.91 Maryland, however, has recognized
a cause of action for breach of contract when an employer discharges an
employee solely because employee has filed or intends to file a claim for workmen's compen-
sation, or because employee has testified or intends to testify in proceedings under Virginia
Worker's Compensation Act).
86. See id. § 40.1-28.7 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (providing that no person shall discriminate
against physically handicapped employee whose handicap does not interfere with employee's
job performance); id. § 34-29(f) (1984) (providing that no person shall discharge employee
where court has subjected employee's wages to garnishment for employee's indebtedness).
87. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing widespread acceptance of public
policy exception to employment-at-will doctrine).
88. See Washington, B. & A.R.R. Co. v. Moss, 127 Md. 12,.., 96 A. 273, 276 (1915).
In Moss, the employer induced an employee to close the employee's business and lease the
employee's business premises to the employer under the oral promise of employment with the
employer. Id. at... , 96 A. at 273-74. The employee performed his obligations under the
agreement but the employer refused to provide employment for the employee. Id. The Maryland
Court of Appeals held that no action would lie for breach of the employment contract, stating
that the employment was terminable at the pleasure of either party in spite of the employee's
detrimental reliance. Id. The Moss court explained that the court's function was to uphold,
unimpaired, the established laws, and that the court simply could not create contracts between
parties to avoid injustice. Id.; see also State Comm'n on Human Relations v. Amecon Div. of
Litton Sys., Inc., 278 Md. 120, 126, 360 A.2d 1, 5 (1976) (stating that common law rule of
employment-at-will permitted employer or employee to terminate employment at pleasure);
Vincent v. Palmer, 179 Md. 365,_...._, 19 A.2d 183, 187 (1941) (same).
89. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland's exception to
employment-at-will based on added consideration of employee) and notes 96-101 and accom-
panying text (discussing Maryland's public policy exception to employment-at-will rule).
90. See Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156, 1158 (4th Cir. 1982) (Fourth Circuit
affirming ruling of Maryland District Court). In Page v. Carolina Coach Co., the employee asserted
that his discharge breached an oral contract of lifetime employment. Id. at 1156. The employee
alleged that he had relinquished other employment, assuming a new position with the employer
under a promise of lifetime employment. Id. at 1157-58. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit stated that, under Maryland law, a contract for lifetime employment was
enforceable if an employee had given valuable consideration in addition to the employee's
regular employment duties. Id. at 1158. The Fourth Circuit, however, held that mere relinquish-
ment of a job was insufficient as a matter of law to constitute consideration for a lifelong
employment contract. Id.; see also Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572, 581
(D. Md. 1982) (court holding that relinquishment of alternative employment was insufficient
consideration to modify contract for at-will employment); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v.
Murray, 198 Md. 526,-., 84 A.2d 870, 873 (1951) (same).
91. See Pullman Co. v. Ray, 201 Md. 268,-, 94 A.2d 266, 270 (1953) (holding that
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employee in violation of a personnel policy that the employer has commu-
nicated to the employee. 92
Maryland has been more willing to allow claims of wrongful discharge
based upon theories of tort law than claims based upon theories of contract
law. 93 In the case of Adler v. American Standard Corp.,94 the Maryland
Court of Appeals held than an employee could maintain a wrongful discharge
claim when the employee's discharge violated a clear mandate of public
policy.9" In Adler, an employer dismissed an employee who had reported to
superiors many potentially illegal practices and methods of operation ongoing
within the employer's business. 96 On certification from the Untied States
District Court of Maryland, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that the
employee's claims were insufficient to state a cause of action in tort against
the employer because the employee had failed to cite specific statutes that
the employer had violated. 97 On remand, the United States District Court of
employee's relinquishment of personal injury claim against employer in exchange for promise
of lifetime employment was sufficient to modify at-will employment contract to contract for
lifetime employment).
92. See Staggs v. Blue Cross of Md., 61 Md. App. 381, 392, 486 A.2d 798, 803-04 (1985).
In Staggs v. Blue Cross of Md., employees alleged that their discharge violated the employer's
personnel policy statements. Id. at 387, 486 A.2d at 800. The employees had begun employment
without any contract regarding the duration of employment. Id. at 384, 486 A.2d at 799. The
employer, however, later distributed a memorandum among the employees explaining that the
employer would dismiss an employee only when cause for dismissal existed and, in most
circumstances, only after the employee previously had received two formal counseling sessions
regarding complaints about the employee's job performance. Id. at 384-85, 486 A.2d at 799-
800. The employees stated that the employer discharged them without following the personnel
policy. Id. at 387, 486 A.2d at 800. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that
provisions in an employer's policy statements that limit an employer's discretion in terminating
at-will employment or that prescribe required procedures for termination of at-will employment
may, when properly communicated to the employee, become contractual obligations of the
employer which are enforceable by an employee. Id. at 392, 486 A.2d at 803-04. Thus, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals declared that the lower court's earlier grant of summary
judgment for the employer was inappropriate and remanded the case to the Baltimore County
Circuit Court for trial. Id. at 393, 486 A.2d at 804; see also Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277
Md. 471, 476, 356 A.2d 221, 231 (1976) (discussing proposition that certain employer policy
directives pertaining to employment relationship became contractual obligations when, with
knowledge of existence of directives, employee starts or continues working for employer).
93. See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland's public policy
exception to employment-at-will rule).
94. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
95. Id. at 45, 432 A.2d at 473.
96. See id. at 34, 432 A.2d at 466. In Adler, the employee's duties were to conduct a
thorough analysis of the operational and management structure of the employer's business and
to recommend changes that would enhance efficiency within the business. Id. at 33, 432 A.2d
at 466. The employee discovered many possibly illegal practices, including payment of commer-
cial bribes and falsification of corporate financial records and statistics. Id. Shortly before a
meeting with the corporation's headquarters personnel, the employee's immediate superiors
discharged the employee on the grounds of unsatisfactory performance. Id. at 34, 432 A.2d at
466. The employee alleged that his superiors discharged him to prevent headquarters personnel
from learning of the discovered activities. Id.
97. See id. at 47, 432 A.2d at 472-73. The Adler court declared that the employee's
allegations did not furnish a sufficient factual predicate for the court to decide whether the
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Maryland granted recovery to the employee after the employee had amended
the complaint to include specific violations of statutory law. 9 The Maryland
Appellate Court's holding in Adler indicates that an employee in Maryland
may maintain a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the termination
has violated the public policy of a statute enacted by the Maryland legisla-
ture. 99 Adler implies that the scope of Maryland's public policy exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine is very similar to the public policy exception
that Virginia recently has adopted.'00 In both Maryland and Virginia courts
have granted public policy exceptions only when an employee's dismissal has
contravened the public policy of a preexisting statute)10'
While the Maryland courts have been reluctant to recognize causes of
action under contract law and have recognized only a limited tort cause of
action for discharge of at-will employees, an abundance of statutes in
Maryland restrict the right to discharge at-will employees. 02 The Maryland
Code provides that an employer may not discharge an employee due to race,
color, sex, religion, age, national origin, marital status, or physical or mental
handicap unrelated in nature to the performance of employment.'0 3 Other
statutes prescribed by the Maryland legislature prevent an employer from
discharging an employee for filing a workman's compensation claim,'04 for
refusing to take a polygraph test, 05 for serving on a jury,' °6 and for active
involvement in proceedings related to the Maryland Occupational Safety and
Health Act.' 7 Maryland labor regulations purport to foster the public policy
employer violated a declared public policy. Id. at 46, 432 A.2d at 472. The Maryland Court of
Appeals, however, stated that the court did no confine itself simply to legislative enactments,
previous judicial decisions, or administrative regulations in determining Maryland's public
policy. Id. at 45, 432 A.2d at 472. The decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals, therefore,
has given rise to speculation that the court might allow a suit based upon public policy even
though not evinced by a statute. See Abramson & Silvestri, supra note 45, at 270.
98. See Adler, 538 F. Supp. 572, 578 (D. Md. 1982). The district court of Maryland noted
that the employee's second amended complaint was identical to the employee's previous
complaint except that the employee had enumerated in the second amended complaint several
federal and state statutes that the employer's agents allegedly had violated. Id. at 575. Finding
that the employee's second amended complaint recited the specific statutes that the employer
violated, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted recovery to the
employee. Id. at 578.
99. See id. Maryland's public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule, however,
applies only when no statute provides an alternative remedy to an alleged wrongful discharge.
Chekey v. BTR Realty, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 715, 716-17 (D. Md. 1983).
100. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing scope of Virginia's public
policy exception to employment-at-will rule).
101. See id. (discussing Virginia's public policy exception to employment-at-will rule); supra
notes 94-100 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland's public policy exception to employ-
ment-at-will rule).
102. See Abramson & Silvestri, supra note 45, at 262 (discussing statutory restrictions in
Maryland limiting application of employment-at-will doctrine).
103. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B § 16(a)(1) (1979).
104. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101 § 39A (1985).
105. MD. ANN. CODE art. 100 § 95 (1985).
106. MD. CTS. & J1D. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 8-105, -401 (1984).
107. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89 § 43 (1985).
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underlying the activities that these statutes protect.'10 The Maryland legislature's
regulations regarding employment relationships are necessary only because the
employment-at-will doctrine enables employers to freely terminate employment
contracts for an unspecified term.' 09 The Maryland labor regulations that
restrict employers' discretion in terminating at-will employees demonstrate the
Maryland legislature's awareness of the continued vitality of the employment-
at-will doctrine."10
Like Virginia and Maryland, the North Carolina courts in the past have
adhered strictly to the rule that an employment contract for an indefinite
period of time is terminable at the will of either party without notice and
for any reason."' The North Carolina courts generally have refused to allow
contract causes of action involving discharge of an at-will employee."12 Only
when an employee has given valuable consideration in addition to the
employee's services have the North Carolina courts considered the contract
to be enforceable."I3 In Dotson v. Royster Guano Co.,"14 the Supreme Court
of North Carolina held that when an employer had induced an employee to
108. See Abramson & Silvestri, supra note 45, at 262 (discussing statutory restrictions in
Maryland limiting application of employment-at-will doctrine).
109. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (discussing labor relations prior to
adoption of employment-at-will rule).
110. Abramson & Silvestri, supra note 45, at 262.
111. See Tuttle v, Kernersville Lumber Co., 263 N.C. 216, 219, 139 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1964)
(permanent employment, in absence of provisions setting forth duration of service, is generally
employment terminable at will); infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text (discussing North
Carolina law on employment-at-will doctrine).
112. See Burkhimer v. Gealth, 39 N.C. App. 450, 454, 250 S.E.2d 678, 682 (1979), cert.
denied, 297 N.C. 298, 254 S.E,2d 918. In Burkhimer v. Gealth, the employer discharged the
employee despite a lifetime employment contract that the employer allegedly had made with the
employee. Id. at 452, 250 S.E.2d at 680. The North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the
employment contract between the parties was for an indefinite period and was terminable at
the pleasure of either party. Id. at 454, 250 S.E.2d at 682. The Burkhimer court explained that
the employee had failed to produce evidence that he had given sufficient consideration to make
the employment contract enforceable. Id.; see also Williams v. Biscuitville, Inc., 40 N.C. App.
405, 408, 253 S.E.2d 18, 20 (1979) (holding that policies from operations manual regarding discharge
procedures were not basis for establishing breach of contract), cert. denied, 297 N.C. 457, 256
S.E.2d 810; Tuttle v. Kernersville Lumber Co., 263 N.C. 216, 219, 139 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1964)
(holding that employee had no grounds for breach of employment contract although employee's
services had been satisfactory prior to discharge); Malever v. Jewelry Co., 223 N.C. 148, 149,
25 S.E.2d 436, 437 (1943) (denying recovery when employer discharged employee after having
induced employee to relinquish former position under promise of employment on permanent and
regular basis with employer).
113. See Jones v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 206 N.C. 862, 864, 175 S.E. 167, 167
(1934) (holding that employer could not discharge employee without cause after employee had
moved to different state in reliance upon promise of permanent employment); Dotson v. Royster
Guano Co., 207 N.C. 635, 636, 178 S.E. 100, 101 (1935) (allowing recovery for breach of
contract when employee released personal injury claim against employer in return for promise
of permanent employment); Fisher v. Roper Lumber Co., 183 N.C. 485, 489, 111 S.E. 857,
860 (1922) (same).
114. 207 N.C. 635, 178 S.E: 100 (1935).
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forego a personal injury claim under promises of permanent employment,
the employer then could not dismiss the employee without cause.' The
Dotson court indicated that by foregoing an injury claim, the employee had
given sufficient consideration for the employment contract to be binding
between the parties." 6 The Dotson court, therefore, granted recovery to the
discharged employee for the employer's breach of the parties' employment
contract."
7
North Carolina has refused until recently to recognize that a cause of
action in tort exists for wrongful discharge when no statute provides a right
to recovery. "  The Appellate Court of North Carolina in Sides v. Duke
Hospital, " 9 however, recognized a public policy exception to the employment-
at-will rule. 20 In Sides, the employer, Duke Hospital, discharged an employee
who refused to testify falsely on behalf of a fellow employee involved in a
medical malpractice trial.' 2' The Sides court held that the employer's efforts
to persuade the employee to testify falsely or incompletely at trial constituted
an offense once punishable under North Carolina common law, and now
115. See id. at 636, 178 S.E. at 101. In Dotson v. Royster Guano Co., the employee, while
laboring for the employer, suffered an injury that led to amputation of the employee's leg. Id.
at 635, 178 S.E. at 101. In return for the release of the employee's claim for damages arising
from the injury, the employer agreed to give the employee employment for life. Id. Despite the
agreement between the parties, the employer dismissed the employee approximately 18 years
after the employee had sustained his leg injury. Id.
116. Id. at 636, 178 S.E. at 101.
117. Id.
118. See Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 297-98, 244 S.E.2d 272, 275-
76, petition for discretionary review denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978). In Dockery
v. Lampart Table Co., the employee sustained numerous injuries during the course of employ-
ment. Id. at 294, 244 S.E.2d at 274. The employee filed a claim under the North Carolina
Workman's Compensation Act to recover for the damages resulting from the injury. Id.; see
also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97 (1985) (North Carolina's Workman's Compensation Act). Three
months after the employee filed the workman's compensation claim, the employer dismissed
the employee. Id. at 298, 244 S.E.2d at 274. The discharged employee argued that the North
Carolina courts should grant recovery to an employee when discharge was in retaliation for the
employee's pursuit of a statutory or constitutional right. Id. The North Carolina Court of
Appeals rejected the employee's argument, stating that the North Carolina legislature, rather
than the North Carolina courts, was responsible for providing remedies for employees claiming
wrongful discharge. Id.
119. 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (1985).
120. See Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 343, 328 S.E.2d at 826-27 (holding that employer could
not dismiss at-will employee for unlawful reason that contravened public policy); infra notes
121-24 (discussing facts and legal analysis of Sides).
121. See Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 334, 328 S.E.2d 821-22. In Sides v. Duke Hospital, the
employee, a nurse at Duke Hospital, had watched a hospital physician negligently administer
anesthesia to a patient, which resulted in permanent brain damage to the patient. Id. at 333,
328 S.E.2d 821. Physicians and attorneys of Duke Hospital attempted to persuade the employee
to testify falsely at the ensuing malpractice trial regarding the employee's knowledge of the
physician's administration of anesthesia. Id. The employee testified truthfully at the trial, which
resulted in a verdict against the hospital. Id. Three months later, the employee's supervisor
discharged the employee. Id. at 334, 328 S.E.2d at 821-22.
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punishable under the General Statutes of North Carolina. 2 2 The Appellate
Court of North Carolina stated further that the employer's conduct offended
the integrity of the judicial system, interfering with the court's duty to
administer justice fairly. 23 The court declared than an employer could not
discharge an at-will employee for any unlawful purpose or reason which
contravened public policy. 24 As a result of Sides, employers now may incur
liability when an employee's discharge is inconsistent with policy considera-
tions underlying federal and state law.125 Compared to the public policy
exceptions of Virginia and Maryland, North Carolina's exception appears to
provide greater protection to the employee. 26 Unlike Maryland and Virginia,
North Carolina has not specified that only a statutory violation of law will
invoke the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
27
West Virginia, like the other states within the jurisdiction of the Fourth
Circuit, has carved out few exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.
2 8
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has determined that an at-will
employee ordinarily has no cause of action against the employee's former
employer based upon theories of contract law. 29 The court has stated simply
122. See id. at 337-38, 328 S.E.2d at 823. The Sides court noted that perjury and
subornation of perjury were once felonies at common law and were presently punishable under
North Carolina statutory law. Id. The Sides court stated further that intimidation of witnesses
was an offense at common law and was punishable in North Carolina as a misdemeanor. Id.
at 338, 328 S.E.2d at 823.
123. Id. at 338, 328 S.E.2d at 823-24.
124. See id. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826. The Sides court reached its decision by reasoning
that interpreting the law otherwise would encourage lawlessness. Id.
125. Id.
126. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia's public policy
exception to employment-at-will doctrine); supra notes 94-101 (discussing Maryland's public
policy exception to employment-at-will doctrine).
127. See Sides, 74 N.C. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826-27. The North Carolina Court of Appeals
in Sides did not stipulate whether the public policy exception would extend to situations in
which discharge was in contravention of public policy principles of North Carolina common
law. See id. Thus, some uncertainty exists regarding the precise scope of North Carolina's
public policy exception.
128. See infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text (discussing status of employment-at-
will doctrine in West Virginia).
129. Wright v. Standard Ultramarine and Color Co.; 141 W. Va. 368, 380, 90 S.E.2d 459,
468 (1955). In Wright v. Standard Ultramarine and Color Co., the employer allegedly discharged
the employee to avoid paying premiums under the employee's annuity retirement plan and to
prevent the employee from receiving benefits under the plan. Id. at 372, 90 S.E.2d at 463. The
employee asserted that the employer's conduct amounted to a breach of an employment contract
between the parties. Id. The employee contended that the employer's promises of retirement
income had induced the employee to continue working for the employer. Id. Furthermore, the
employee asserted that the employer had agreed to retain the employee for so long as the
employee properly performed employment duties. Id. The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals found that the employee had given no consideration that would create an enforceable
employment contract between the parties. Id. at 381, 90 S.E.2d at 467. Consequently, the
Wright court determined that the employment relationship was terminable at-will and that either
party could terminate such an employment arrangement without liability for breach of contract.
[Vol. 43:431
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
that an employee may not recovery for breach of an employment contract
of indefinite duration in the absence of extra consideration on the part of
the employee, because the employment-at-will doctrine permits either party
to terminate the relationship with or without cause. a0 In West Virginia,
therefore, an employer is never liable for breach of contract when discharging
an at-will employee.'
Until recently, West Virginia permitted no cause of action in tort for
wrongful discharge of an at-will employee. 3 2 In Harless v. First National
Bank in Fairmont, 3 3 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that
an employer is liable in tort when the employer dismisses an employee
to contravene some substantial public policy principle. 34 The Harless court
indicated that the employee's dismissal resulted from the employee's attempts
to curtail the employer's intentional violations of the West Virginia Consumer
and Protection Act. 3 The court determined that the legislature had intended
to establish a clear and unequivocal public policy that consumers of credit
have protection from lending institutions seeking to violate provisions of the
Act. 36 Because the employee in Harless had attempted to uphold the policy
of the Act, the court held the employer liable in tort for the employee's
Id. at 382, 90 S.E.2d at 468; see also Bell v. South Penn Natural Gas Co., 135 W. Va. 25, 32,
62 S.E.2d 285, 288-89 (1950) (discussing proposition that employment of indefinite duration is
terminable by employer or employee at any time); Adkins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 130 W.
Va. 362, 371, 43 S.E.2d 372, 377 (1947) (same); Resener v. Watts, Ritter & Co., 73 W. Va.
342, 344-45, 80 S.E. 839, 840 (1914) (same).
130. Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178, 182 (W. Va. 1980).
131. See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 162 W. Va. 116, 124, 246 S.E.2d 270,
275 (1978) (noting that discharging employee at-will is wrongful only when discharge violates
significant West Virginia public policy principle).
132. See id. (discussing prior absence of public policy exception to employment-at-will rule
in West Virginia).
133. 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978).
134. Id. at 124, 246 S.E.2d at 275.
135. See id. at 118-20, 246 S.E.2d at 272-73. In Harless, the employee discovered that the
employer, First National Bank in Fairmont, intentionally had overcharged bank customers on
prepayment of customers' installment loans. Id. at 119, 246 S.E.2d at 272. The employee
reported the illegal activities to his supervisors. Id. After a series of investigations revealing
several illegal banking practices, the employers discharged the employee. Id. at 119, 246 S.E.2d
at 273. The Harless court stated that the employee's complaint, which referred to the employer's
intentional overcharging of installment loan customers, alleged willful violations of West Virginia
Code section 46A-1-101, known as the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. Id.
at 125, 246 S.E.2d at 275-76; W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-101 (1985).
136. Harless, 116 W. Va. at 125, 246 S.E.2d at 276. The Harless court noted that the West
Virginia legislature imposed criminal sanctions for certain willful violations of the West Virginia
Consumer Credit and Protection Act. Id. at 125, 246 S.E.2d at 275-76. West Virginia Code
section 46-5-103 explains that any person violating provisions of the Consumer Credit and
Protection Act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall receive a fine of not more than $1000
or imprisonment for not more than one year, or shall receive both a fine and imprisonment.
W. VA. CODE § 46A-5-103 (1980). See generally Cardi, The West Virginia Consumer Credit and
Protection Act, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 401 401-519 (providing full account of history and scope of
West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act).
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termination. 37 The Harless court explained West Virginia's view of the
employment-at-will doctrine, stating that discharging an at-will employee was
not wrong unless carrying out such a discharge contravened some statutory
expression of public policy.
38
Similar to the other states within the jurisdiction of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, South Carolina has continued to
adhere to the employment-at-will rule, declaring repeatedly that indefinite
term employment is terminable at any time by either party for any reason
or for no reason at all. 3 9 An examination of the employment-at-will cases
in South Carolina indicates that the courts within South Carolina have been
reluctant to allow contract or tort theories of recovery that would temper
the harshness of the employment-at-will doctrine. 40 The courts in South
Carolina have continued to propound the rule that when a contract of
permanent employment has no consideration other than the employee's
obligation to perform work and the employer's obligation to pay wages, the
contract is terminable at will.' 41 Acknowledging on several occasions that
other states have recognized a public policy exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine, the Supreme Court of South Carolina consistently has declined
to adopt such an exception to the rule. 42 Even the South Carolina legislature
has made little attempt to provide statutory provisions that would provide
an employee with any recourse for wrongful discharge. 43 Clearly, in South
Carolina, an employer may discharge an employee under almost any circum-
stances without incurring liability as a result.
In spite of continued adherence to the employment-at-will doctrine,
public policy considerations have prompted the majority of the states within
the jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit to recognize a tort action for wrongful
discharge. 44 Adoption of the public policy exception to the employment-at-
137. Harless, 116 W. Va. at 125, 246 S.E.2d at 276.
138. Id.
139. See Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 276 S.C. 284, 289-90, 278
S.E.2d 607, 609-10 (1981) (holding that indefinite term employment is terminable by either
party at any time and for any reason); Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., Inc., 273 S.C. 766,
769, 259 S.E.2d 812, 812-13 (1979) (same); Ross v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 273 S.C. 764, 765,
259 S.E.2d 814, 815 (1979)(same).
140. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (providing cases noting South Carolina's
strict adherence to employment-at-will doctrine).
141. See Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 283 S.C. 149, 155, 321 S.E.2d 618,
620-21 (1984) (holding that employee had no cause of action although discharge resulted from
employee's testimony in hearing).
142. See supra note 139 (citing South Carolina Supreme Court cases refusing to adopt
exceptions to employment-at-will rule).
143. See, e.g., S.C. GEN. STAT. § 16-17-560 (1976) (preventing employer from lawfully
discharging employee for employee's political opinion or employee's exercise of civil rights); id.
§ 41-15-510 (1976) (preventing employer from discharging employee for participating in pro-
ceedings under Occupational Health and Safety Act); id. § 41-15-520 (1976) (providing remedy
to employee when employer has discharged employee in violation of Occupation Health and
Safety Act).
144. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia's public policy
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will rule benefits employees because the public policy exception prohibits
discharges that result from an exerdise of employee rights.'4 5 States cor-
rectly apply the public policy exception only to discharges that contravene
interests recognized by federal and state law. 46 Adopting a public policy
exception by making ad hoc determinations of what constitutes important
public policies is inadvisable, because the ad hoc determinations create
uncertainty regarding the scope of protection that the tort action for wrongful
discharge provides.
The states within the Fourth Circuit likewise would be correct to permit
an exception to the employment-at-will rule when an employee can prove
reliance on implied-in-fact promises that limit the employer's discretion to
discharge. '4When an employee can show that he has furnished consideration
to the employer in addition to the obligation to work for wages, promises
of the employer regarding job security and duration of employment become
enforceable provisions of the employment contract. 14 When an employer
wishes to foreclose the possibility that an employee will develop legitimate
expectations concerning the employer's promises, the employer simply can
refrain from making promises.'
49
While the states within the Fourth Circuit have adopted some measures
that limit an employer's discretion to discharge,' 50 the states within the
Fourth Circuit have declined to imply a duty to terminate an employment
contract in good faith. Although a good faith exception to the employment-
at-will rule may act as a deterrent to wrongful discharge, a refusal to
recognize the exception is perhaps appropriate. A great deal of litigation has
exception); supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland's public policy
exception); supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina's public
policy exception); supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text (discussing West Virginia's public
policy exception).
145. See supra notes 46-49 (explaining that protection afforded employees through public
policy exception differs according to state's definition of public policy).
146. See supra note 47 (discussing cases in which court granted public policy exception in
response to discharge jeopardizing statutory policy of encouraging full and honest testimony).
147. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (explaining how courts determine whether
exception regarding implied-in-fact contractual provisions is applicable in suit for wrongful
discharge).
148. See id.
149. See Boyette, supra note 65, at 763-68. By controlling communications with an
employee, an employer can minimize chances that a discharged at-will employee will bring a
suit against the employer for breach of the employment contract. Id. at 764. In the employment
application, an employer should makp explicit the provisions regarding job duration and the
employer's ability to terminate the employment. Id. In the hiring interview, recruitment personnel
should then emphasize to job applicants that the employment is terminable with or without
cause at any time, avoiding any sweeping statements about duration of employment or assurances
of job security. Id. at 765. In the portions of personnel manuals that address termination
procedures, the employer should disclaim explicitly any intent to form a binding employment
contract between the parties. Id. at 766.
150. See supra notes 57-143 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of limited excep-
tions to employment-at-will rule by states within Fourth Circuit).
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arisen over what constitues good cause to discharge an employee.' 5' Thus,
when employers have to show good cause to dismiss employees, fears of
litigation might force a company to retain employees despite the employees'
possible shortcomings. Retaining unsatisfactory workers merely out of fear
of litigation would undermine efficiency in the market place.
H. TUCKER DEWEY
B. Determining the Free Speech
Rights of Public Employees
The first amendment guarantee of free speech' is a qualified right.2 The
right to free speech is a qualified right because in some circumstances the
government's interest in restraining speech will prevail over citizens' free
speech interests.' In guaranteeing the right to free speech, the first amendment
stringently guards a citizen's right to engage in uninhibited debate on matters
of public concern. 4 Not all citizens, however, enjoy the same degree of first
151. Comment, Employment At Will and the Law of Contracts, supra note 54, at 229.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech . . ." Id. Decisions from the Supreme Court
illustrate that the Framers of the first amendment intended primarily for the first amendment
to protect free discussion of public affairs. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
296-97 (1964) (emphasizing first amendment right to free expression on public questions). For
example, the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times v. Sullivan recognizes a profound
national commitment to uninhibited debate on public questions. Id. at 270. In addition, free
discussion is essential to the vitality of governmental institutions. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 4 (1948). Through free political discussion, government remains responsive to the will
of the people. DeJong v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937). The unfettered interchange of ideas
brings about changes the people desire. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). The first
amendment protects even those ideas involving the slightest social importance, including
controversial ideas, unorthodox ideas, and ideas that differ from the prevailing point of view
to the extent that such ideas are not excludable as encroaching on more important interests. Id.
2. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951). The guarantee of freedom of speech
does not give one the right to speak in any manner, at any time or at any place. Id.; see Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. at 482 (1957) (guarantee of freedom of speech gives no absolute
protection). For example, obscene, profane, and libelous speech does not warrant first amend-
ment protection. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (defining
classes of speech that first amendment does not protect).
3. See generally M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, A TREATISE ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT §§ 2.01-2.02 (1984) (discussing restrictions on first amendment free speech). The
government restricts speech in the interest of maintaining public order. See American Commu-
nications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950) (discussing conflict between interest
in public order, and interest in free speech). Similarly, the government has an interest in
restraining free speech to foster national security. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing conflict between interest in national
security and interest in free speech).
4. See supra note I (emphasizing that first amendment protection extends primarily to
free discussion of matters of public interest).
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amendment protection.' For example, because the state has an interest in
regulating the speech of public employees to facilitate efficiency in the
services that public employees provide to the state, 6 the state restricts the
free speech rights of public employees more than the state limits the free
speech rights of citizens in general.7 Although the state may limit the scope
of the free speech rights of public employees, the state cannot condition
public employment on the relinquishment of the first amendment right to
comment on matters of public concern.' In determining the extent to which
5. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (state's interest in regulating
speech of public employees differs significantly from state's interest in regulating speech of
citizens generally; Vicksburg Firefighters, Etc. v. City of Vicksburg, Miss., 761 F.2d 1036,
1039 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); see also infra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (discussing state's
interest in regulating speech of public employees).
6. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (discussing state's interest in regulating speech of public
employees). Since government employees provide indispensable services, the public interest
demands an effective, disciplined administration of government agencies. See Note, Nonpartisan
Speech in the Police Department: The Aftermath of Pickering, 7 HAsTINOs CoNsT. L.Q. 1001,
1002 (1980) (discussing inefficiency and disharmony resulting from unrestrained speech by public
employees). Uninhibited speech by public employees often results in inefficiency in the govern-
mental office. Id.; see generally Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HAuv. L.
REv. 1611, 1738-80 (1984) (overview of evolution of Supreme Court's approach to first
amendment protection of public employee's free speech rights).
7. See McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 1985) (state subjects members
of law enforcement agency to more restricted form of first amendment protection than most
other citizens); see also supra note 6 (discussing state's interest in regulating speech of public
employees). The degree of first amendment protection afforded a public employee varies
according to the character of the public employment. See Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407,
1419 (1983) (law enforcement agency has greater interest than typical government employer in
regulating speech of public employees), cert. denied sub nom. Hughes v. Hoffman, 465 U.S.
1023 (1984); see also Note, supra note 6 at 1013 (discussing difference in first amendment rights
of public school teachers and police officers). For example, employment as a school teacher
differs in nature and character from employment as a police officer. See Brukiewa v. Police
Comm'r of Baltimore, 257 Md. 36, 74-75, 263 A.2d 210, 229 (1970) (Barnes, J., dissenting).
The dissent in Brukiewa explains that, unlike a school teacher, the state charges a police officer
with the preservation of public safety and security. Id. The carrying out of the duties that the
law assigns to the police requires discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity. Kelley v. Johnson,
425 U.S. 238, 246 (1975). Due to the organized structure and disciplined rank and file, police
are a paramilitary force. See Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 321 (3d Cir. 1977) (Rosenn,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978). Since police are a
paramilitary force the dissent in Gasparinetti asserted that the government has a greater need
to regulate the speech of policemen. Id. Consequently, because of the unique characteristics of
police employment, a police officer's right to comment on matters involving his employment is
limited. See Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1970) (discussing first amendment
rights of police). In contrast, maximum first amendment protection facilitates the public school
teacher's interest in encouraging students to consider and discuss ideas concerning public issues.
Brukiewa, 263 A.2d at 229 (Barnes, J., dissenting). Therefore, by virtue of the nature and
character of teaching, the public school teacher enjoys maximum free speech protection. Id.
8. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. In Pickering, the United States Supreme Court held
that.a state cannot compel a public school teacher to relinquish the first amendment right to
comment on a matter of public concern involving the operation of the school. Id. In so holding,
the Pickering court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Keyishan v. Board of Regents.
Id.; Keyishan, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967). The Keyishan Court rejected the theory that the
state can subject the attainment of public employment to conditions. Keyishan, 385 U.S. at
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the state can limit the right of a public employee to comment on matters of
public concern, courts must balance the interest of the public employee, as
a citizen, to speak on matters of public concern, with the state's interest as
an employer, to provide efficient services through public employees.9
The issue of the free speech rights of public employees frequently arises
when a public employee speaks critically about the government agency for
which he works and the employer retaliates by demoting or discharging the
employee.' 0 A public employee claiming wrongful demotion or discharge in
reprisal for exercising free speech rights first must demonstrate that the
speech or conduct qualifies for first amendment protection." To determine
605-06; see also Wentz v. Klecker, 721 F.2d 244, 246 (8th Cir. 1983) (state cannot compel public
employees to relinquish first amendment right to speak on matters of public concern).
The threat of employment reprisal inhibits the speech of public employees. See Pickering,
391 U.S. at 574 (recognizing threat of dismissal as potent means of inhibiting speech). Retaliatory
action by an employer can trigger first amendment rights. See McGill v. Board of Educ. of
Pekin Elementary School, 602 F.2d 774, 779-80 (7th Cir. 1979). The Seventh Circuit in McGill
v. Board of Education of Pekin Elementary School held that the test to determine whether
retaliatory action by an employer triggers first amendment rights is whether the retaliatory
action is likely to chill the employee's exercise of speech protected by the first amendment. Id.;
cf. Note, supra note 3, at 1003 (discussing chilling effect on public employee speech resulting
from restrictions on first amendment rights).
9. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. In Pickering, the Supreme Court considered the first
amendment rights of Pickering, a public school teacher. Id. at 569-74. The defendant school
board dismissed Pickering after Pickering wrote a letter to a local newspaper that criticized the
board's allocation of school funds between educational and athletic programs. Id. at 566. The
Pickering Court established a balancing test to determine whether the first amendment protected
Pickering's conduct in writing the letter to the newspaper. Id. at 568. The Pickering Court
concluded that the court must balance the teacher's interest, as a citizen, in speaking freely on
matters of public concern, against the state's interest, as an employer, in promoting efficiency.
Id. In arriving at a balance between the competing interests of the employee and the state,
Pickering requires the courts to consider the nature of the employment relationships within the
government agency. Id. at 569-70. The Pickering court reasoned that the closer the working
relationships, in terms of day to day contact among co-workers, the greater the state's need to
maintain internal harmony by regulating the speech and conduct of employees. See id.
(explaining the necessity of maintaining personal loyalty and confidence in situations involving
close working relationships). The Supreme Court in Pickering, however, declined to lay down
a general standard for arriving at a balance between the competing interests of the employee
and the state. Id. at 569. Rather, courts must look to the facts of each case when weighing the
employee's interests against the state's interests. See id. (explaining that variety of factual
situations involving critical statements by public employees renders general standard inappro-
priate).
10. See Note, Free Speech and Impermissible Motive in the Dismissal of Public Employees,
89 YALE L.J. 376, 379-80 (1979) (discussing first amendment rights of public employee who
criticizes government agency for which employee works). Employment reprisals against public
employees who criticize operations within the agency can take a variety of forms. See, e.g.,
MacFarlane v. Grasso, 696 F.2d 217, 223 (2d Cir. 1982) (refusal to hire); Watters v. Chaffin,
684 F.2d 833, 836-37 n.9 (11th Cir. 1982) (demotion and transfer); Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d
1251, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1980) (refusal to promote); Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 771-72
(5th Cir. 1979) (suspension).
11. See Mount Healthy School Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)
(explaining that initial burden is on public employee to show that public employee's speech or
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whether a public employee's speech warrants first amendment protection,
courts apply a balancing test promulgated by the United States Supreme
Court in Pickering v. Board of Education.12 Pickering requires courts to
balance the state's interest in promoting efficiency with the public employee's
interest in commenting on matters of public concern.'3 In addition to the
requirement that the public employee demonstrate that the speech or conduct
is constitutionally protected, the Supreme Court's decision in Mount Healthy
School Board of Education v. Doyle4 requires the public employee to show
that the constitutionally protected speech or conduct was the motivating
factor, or "but for" cause, of the demotion or discharge.' 5 Finally, the
conduct qualifies for first amendment protection); see also infra note 15 and accompanying text
(discussing Mount Healthy).
12. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (courts must balance interests of state and employee);
see also supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining Pickering balancing test).
13. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (courts must balance interests of state and employee);
see also supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining Pickering balancing test).
14. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
15. See Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. In Mount Healthy, a public school teacher
brought an action against the Mount Healthy School Board, claiming that the Board had
violated the first amendment by deciding not to rehire the teacher after the teacher had provided
a local radio station with information concerning the school district's teacher dress code. Id. at
282. The Mount Healthy Court held that the district court properly had placed the burden on
the teacher to demonstrate that providing the radio statio with information on the teacher dress
code was constitutionally protected conduct, and that providing the radio station with the
information was a motivating factor in the Board's decision not to rehire the teacher. Id. at
287. The Mount Healthy Court stated that if the teacher demonstrated that the constitutionally
protected conduct was a motivating factor in the Board's decision not to rehire the teacher, the
burden would shift then to the Board to demonstrate that the Board would not have rehired
the teacher even if the teacher had not engaged in the constitutionally protected conduct. Id.
Although Mount Healthy required a public employee's speech or conduct to constitute
the motivating factor in the employee's demotion or discharge, the Supreme Court later refined
Mount Healthy's "motivating factor" requirement into a "but for" standard. See Givhan v.
Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1979). Specifically, the Supreme
Court's decision in Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist. requires courts to find that
the public employer would not have demoted or discharged the public employee "but for" the
employees engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. See id. (illustrating application of
"but for" requirement). Thus, under the "but for" standard, an employee must show that his
speech or conduct was constitutionally protected, and that the constitutionally protected speech
was a motivating factor in the employee's demotion or discharge. See Brasslett v. Cota, 761
F.2d 827, 839 (1st Cir. 1985) (explaining requirements of Mount Healthy). If the employee can
establish that his speech or conduct qualified for constitutional protection and that the
constitutionally protected speech was a motivating factor in the 'employee's demotion or
discharge, then the burden shifts to the employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the employer would have demoted or discharged the employee even if the employee had
not engaged in the constitutionally protected activity. Id.; see also Henderson v. Huecker, 744
F.2d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1984) (explaining requirements of Mount Healthy); Berry v. Bailey, 726
F.2d 670, 674 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (same), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2326 (1985). Thus, under Mount
Healthy, as refined by Givhan, an employee can succeed in a first amendment claim only if the
court finds that the employer would not have demoted or discharged the employee "but for"
the employee's engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. See Note, supra note 10, at 383-
84 (1979) (criticizing Mount Healthy "but for" standard).
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Supreme Court's recent decision in Connick v. Myers 6 narrows the scopd of
Pickering by requiring that a public employee's speech constitute a matter
of public concern in order to qualify for first amendment protection. 7 Under
Connick, courts do not reach the Pickering balancing test unless the public
employee first establishes that the employee's speech or conduct involved a
matter of public concern. 8 The threshold inquiry, therefore, in determining
whether a public employee's speech or conduct qualifies for first amendment
protection is whether the public employee's speech or conduct constitutes a
matter of public concern. 9 Thus, if the public employee satisfies the test
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Pickering, Mount Healthy, and Connick,
the public employee successfully has demonstrated wrongful demotion or
discharge in violation of the first amendment. 20 In Jurgensen v. Fairfax
16. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
17. See id. at 147. In Connick, the Supreme Court considered whether the discharge of
an assistant district attorney for circulating a questionnaire within the district attorney's office
violated the assistant district attorney's first amendment rights. Id. at 146-54. In Connick, a
district attorney had transferred Myers, an assistant district attorney, to a different section of
the criminal court. Id. at 140. Strongly opposed to the transfer, Myers circulated a questionnaire
among the other assistant district attorneys involving office transfer policy, office morale, the
desirability of a grievance committee, the degree of confidence in supervisors, and whether
employees felt pressured to work in office supported political campaigns. Id. at 14i. The
Connick Court held that only the question concerning whether the employees felt pressured to
work in office supported political campaigns involved a matter of public concern. Id. at 149.
The Connick Court, therefore, applying Pickering, concluded that the questionnarie, as a whole,
warranted only limited first amendment protection. Id. at 154. In denying first amendment
protection to the questionnaire, the Supreme Court in Connick stated that although the first
amendment requires public officials to be open to criticism by public employees, the first
amendment does not demand public officials to operate public agencies as a roundtable for
employee dissatisfaction with internal office policy. Id. at 149. The Connick Court emphasized
that when expression by a public employee does not involve any social or political matter of
concern to the community, public employers should enjoy wide deference in the management
of government offices. Id. at 146. The Supreme Court in Connick, therefore held that speech
involving matters of only personal interest do not warrant first amendment protection. Id. at
147. See generally Note, Connick v. Myers: Narrowing the Free Speech Rights of Public
Employers, 33 CATH. U.L. REv. 429, 456 (1984) (Connick's restrictive definition of public
concern narrows first amendment protection of public employees). The Connick Court added
that in determining whether a public employee's speech includes a matter of public concern,
courts must consider the content, form, and context of the employee's statement. Connick, 461
at 147-48. Additionally, the manner, time, and place of the employee's speech or conduct are relevant
considerations in determining whether a public employee's speech or conduct qualifies for first
amendment protection. Id. at 152.
18. See Wilson v. City of Littleton, Colorado, 732 F.2d 765, 769 (10th Cir. 1984)
(interpreting Connick); Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (first amendment protects only matters of
public concern); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing Connick).
19. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (first amendment protects only matters of public
concern); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text (explaining that courts do not proceed
to balancing test unless public employee's speech or conduct involves public concern).
20. Pickering, 361 U.S. at 568; Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, Connick, 461 U.S. at
147. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text (discussing proof required to establish
violation of first amendment based on wrongful demotion or discharge).
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County,2 ' the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit consid-
ered whether Fairfax county wrongfully had demoted a public employee in
retaliation for the employee's exercise of the employee's first amendment
free speech rights.Y
In Jurgensen, the Fairfax County Police Department (Department) had
employed the plaintiff, Robert E. Jurgensen, since 1974 as an Assistant
Squad Supervisor in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).2a The three
major functions of the EOC were telephone answering, radio dispatching,
and computer transactions. 24 In 1980, the Department commissioned an
internal review of the operation of the EOC.2Y Two Fairfax County police
officers conducted the review and prepared an inspection report. 26 The
inspection report was a normal internal administrative review that enumerated
several recommendations for improvement of the EOC. 27 The recommenda-
tions included an increase in staff, modification of new personnel training,
an increase in telephone lines, equipment replacements, and computer pro-
gram changes.28 The inspection report found no illegal action, no abuse of
authority, no corruption or waste, and no discrimination against employees.
29
After the officers conducting the review submitted the inspection report to
the EOC, the Department created a special group to review and implement
the changes recommended in the inspection report.3 0 The group periodically
submitted status reports to Department supervisors, listing steps that the
Department had taken in response to the inspection report's recommenda-
tions.3
21. 745 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1984).
22. See id. at 880-87.
23. Id. at 871.
24. Id. at 871. At the time in question in Jurgensen, the Emergency Operations Center
(EOC) had approximately sixty employees. Id. The EOC divided the employees into squads
working on the 4-10 schedule. Id. The 4-10 schedule results in a compressed work week. Id. at
872 n.2. The compressed work week provides an alternative work schedule by increasing the
number of hours worked per day while reducing the number of days worked per week so that
the employee works the standard number of weekly hours in less than five days. Id. The
Department's change to the 4-10 schedule constituted a primary cause of Jurgensen's dissatis-
faction. Id. at 874 n.4. Because all police, fire, and rescue communications for Fairfax County
are located at the EOC, the EOC must operate twenty-four hours a day. Id. at 871.
25. Id. at 871.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 872. The Jurgensen court described the inspection report's recommendations
as "housekeeping" recommendations. Id. The report stated that the understaffing and 4-10
scheduled had created a stressful work environment. Id. at 871. The inspection report also
recommended modifications in the training of new personnel to alleviate the current delay in
the institution of a new employee's formal training. Id. at 872. Additionally, the inspection
report recommended an auxiliary power system to enable the EOC to cope with a power failure.
Id.
29. Id. at 871.
30. Id. at 872.
31. Id. at 873. In Jurgensen, the Fourth Circuit noted the steps that the EOC had taken
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In April or May 1981, a Washington Post reporter telephoned the EOC
and talked with the plaintiff, Jurgensen, about general conditions within the
Department.3 2 During the telephone conversation, Jurgensen agreed to a
private meeting with a Washington Post reporter.3 3 At a private meeting,
Jurgensen referred to the inspection report while describing to a Washington
Post reporter the problems in the EOC. 34 Subsequently, the Washington Post
reporter arrived at the police department headquarters to interview Chief
Carroll D. Buracker concerning problems in the EOC. 31 The Washington
Post reporter also requested permission to read the inspection report, but
Chief Buracker refused to release the inspection report to the reporter,
explaining that the inspection report was a confidential internal review.
3 6
Chief Buracker, however, did permit the reporter to inspect EOC operations
and to speak freely with employees.3 7 Unsatisfied with the information
collected during his inspection of the EOC and during conversations with
EOC employees, the Washington Post reporter requested that Jurgensen
provide him with a copy of the inspection report.38 The reporter was persistent
in his requests. 39 Without authorization and in knowing violation of depart-
to implement the recommendation of the inspection report. Id. The steps taken by the EOC
included instructions to the Director of Communications to explore the procedure for acquiring
additional frequencies for EOC use, a requisition for a new conveyor belt, a supplemental
appropriation of $60,000 to replace the Mobile Center in the EOC, formation of a Training
Task Force to provide EOC improved training services, a request for five additional EOC
positions for the next fiscal year, plans for an emergency generator and plans for termination
of the 4-10 schedule. Id. Subsequent status reports in 1981 noted the successful implementation
of the new training program and the addition of six EOC positions. Id. In June 1981, the Fairfax
County Executive provided the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County with a full report detail-
ing each recommendation noted in the inspection report. Id. at 874. The report to the Board
of Supervisors also described the steps taken by the EOC to comply with the inspection report's
recommendations. Id. at 874. Based on these reports, the Jurgensen court found that the Depart-
ment had undertaken an aggressive program to deal with the problems indicated in the inspection
report. Id.
32. Id. at 874. In Jurgensen, the conversation between the reporter and the plaintiff
centered on an article that appeared in the Washington Post concerning comparative per capita
expenditures for police departments and addressed the low per capita expenditures for the
Fairfax County Police. Id.
33. Id. at 874.
34. Id. In Jurgensen, Jurgensen expressed concern that EOC employees were overworked
and underpaid. Id. at n.5.
35. Id. at 874. The Jurgensen court noted that subsequent to the filing of the inspection
report, the Department promoted Buracker from deputy chief of police to chief of police. Id.
at 877 n.10.
36. Id. at 874.
37. Id. In Jurgensen, the Fourth Circuit noted that the Washington Post reporter
investigating the EOC encountered no difficulty in talking to employees concerning the working
conditions in the EOC. Id. The Jurgensen court further noted that the EOC did not discourage
or criticize EOC employees for expressing opinions on EOC operations, even though some
employees' opinions were critical. Id.
38. Id. at 875.
39. Id. at 875. In Jurgensen, the Washington Post reporter explained that he needed the
inspection report, not because he needed more information for his story, but to verify the
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mental regulations, 40 Jurgensen took a copy of the inspection report from
Department files and gave the report to the Washington Post reporter."
Quoting from the inspection report as well as certain internal depart-
mental memoranda, on June 26, 1981, the Washington Post published an
article on the internal operations of the EOC. 42 The Washington Post article
reported that the EOC was understaffed, that EOC employees were over-
worked, and that employee morale in the Department was low.43 The
Washington Post article reported no corruption, illegality or inattention to
the problems of the EOC on the part of the Department." Subsequently,
the Department began an inquiry to determine which employee had released
the inspection report.4 5 During the departmental inquiry, Jurgensen admitted
supplying the inspection report to the Washington Post reporter.4 6 The
following day, on his own initiative, Jurgensen inquired as to what discipli-
nary recommendation Major Kelly Coffelt, commander of the Department's
Technical Services Bureau, expected to make with regard to Jurgensen's
violation of the departmental regulations.47 Major Coffelt informed Jurgen-
sen that his tentative recommendation would be either a demotion to
communications assistant and a transfer, or at most, termination.48 Upon
Jurgensen's request, Jurgensen and Major Coffelt met with Chief Buracker
to discuss further the disciplinary action that the Department intended to
take against Jurgensen.49 At the meeting with Chief Buracker, Jurgensen
agreed in writing to accept a voluntary demotion if the Department would
drop the disciplinary charges against him.5 0 Several days after Chief Buracker
correctness of quotations from the report. Id. at n.6. The need for verification stemmed from
an incident in which the Washington Post had published a story totally fabricated by the
reporter. Id. Consequently, the Washington Post told Jurgensen that the Washington Post
would run a story on the EOC only if the reporter could obtain a copy of the inspection report.
Id. Jurgensen was reluctant to release the inspection report to the Washington Post reporter
because he knew departmental regulations governed requests for the release of documents. Id.
at 875.
40. Id. at 883. In Jurgensen, the Department charged Jurgensen with the violation of
General Order No. 401 and section 204.4 of the employee regulations of the Fairfax County
Police Department. Id. General Order No. 401 prohibits an employee from releasing any official
information to the news media without specific prior authorization from an information releasing
authority. Id. General Order No. 401 limits the authority to release official information to the
Chief of Police, Deputy Chief of Police, Commander of the Staff Services Division and the
Public Information Officer. Id. Additionally, section 204.4 of the regulations provides that
employees cannot reveal police information unless the police manual so provides. Id.
41. Id. at 875.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 875-76.
44. Id. at 876.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. In Jurgensen, Major Coffelt headed the group assigned to implement the recom-
mendations made in the inspection report. Id. at 872.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 876-77.
50. Id. at 877. The Fourth Circuit in Jurgensen stated that conflicting testimony existed
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and Jurgensen entered into the agreement, Jurgensen requested rescission of
the voluntary demotion.5' Chief Buracker, however, denied Jurgensen's
request for rescission and the Fairfax County Police Department demoted
Jurgensen to a lower rank and assigned him to a different police station. 2
Eleven months after his demotion, Jurgensen filed a civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 198313 in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia.5 4 Jurgensen brought the civil rights action against Fairfax
County, Virginia, the Fairfax County Police Department, and two of the
Department's ranking officers, challenging the validity of the demotion.
5
1
Jurgensen claimed that the demotion was a reprisal for providing the
Washington Post with a copy of a report on the internal inspection of the
EOC and that the demotion violated Jurgensen's first amendment right to
free speech.5 6 In Jurgensen, the defendants claimed that Jurgensen's demotion
as to whether Jurgensen or Chief Buracker first suggested Jurgensen's demotion as punishment
for releasing the inspection report to the Washington Post reporter. Id. Jurgensen testified that
Chief Buracker asked whether Jurgensen would take a voluntary demotion. Id. In contrast,
Chief Buracker testified that Chief Buracker told Jurgensen that he was not prepared to hear
Jurgensen's case, and that Jurgensen responded by requesting that Chief Buracker not hear the
case, but that Chief Buracker instead consider a voluntary demotion. Id.
51. Id. at 877. In Jurgensen, Jurgensen wrote a letter to Chief Buracker requesting rescission
of the demotion and asked that the Department institute ordinary disciplinary proceedings
against him. Id. Jurgensen based his request for rescission on the claim that he was under duress
when he agreed to the voluntary demotion. Id. Jurgensen could seek recourse through the Civil
Service and judiciary if the department dismissed him. Id.
52. Id. at 877.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for a private right of action to
persons deprived of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Specifically, 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides that every person who, under the
color of state law, causes any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to be deprived
of any right secured by the Constitution and laws, will be subject to an action at law, a suit in
equity, or other proceeding for redress. Id. Congress originally enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as
part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. See Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871)
(enacted to enforce provisions of fourteenth amendment and for other purposes) (current version
at 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also H.R. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) (explaining
that § 1983 created federal right of action against government officials who deprive citizens of
constitutional rights), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS 2609, 2609. In 1979,
Congress amended § 1983 to allow a civil action against any person acting under the laws of
the District of Columbia who deprives a person of any statutory or constitutional rights. See
H.R. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1979) (explaining purpose of amendment to Section
1983), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2609, 2609.
54. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 868. Jurgensen sought injunctive and declaratory relief,
damages, and restoration of his position. Id. at 870.
55. Id. at 870.
56. Id. In Jurgensen, Jurgensen, in his complaint, characterized the removal and release
of the inspection report as "whistleblowing." Id. at 870. Whistleblowers are federal government
employees who disclose illegality or improper activity within government. See S. REP. No. 969,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (defining whistleblowers and discussing protection given to federal
whistleblowers), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS 2723, 2730 [hereinafter cited
as SENATE REPORT]. 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(9) is known as the whistleblower statute. 5 U.S.C. §
2301(b)(9) (1982); see Comment, The First Amendment and the Law Enforcement Agency:
Protecting the Employee Who Blows the Whistle, 18 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 789, 791 (1982)
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did not violate the first amendment and asserted that Jurgensen's acceptance
of the demotion rendered the controversy moot.5 7 The district court jury
returned a verdict for Jurgensen,55 finding that the release of the inspection
report, in violation of contrary departmental regulations, had caused the
disciplinary action against Jurgensen.5 9
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the defendants had
(discussing § 2301(b)(9)). Enacted as part of the Civil Service Reform Act, § 2301(b)(9) protects
federal government employees who disclose information involving mismanagement, waste, abuse
of authority, or a threat to public health or safety. 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(9) (1982); see Comment,
supra, at 791 (discussing § 2301(b)(9)). Similarly, § 2302(b)(8) of title 5 of the United States
Code prohibits the taking or failure to take a personnel action with regard to an employee or
applicant for employment in reprisal for disclosing information involving mismanagement, waste,
abuse of authority, or a threat to public health or safety. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (1982). Congress
intended § 2301(b)(9) and § 2302(b)(8) to protect federal employees who disclose illegality,
waste, and corruption within government. See SENATE REPORT, supra, at 2730 (explaining
purpose of whistleblower statute). 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(9); 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). The purpose
of § 2301(b)(9) and § 2302(b)(8), however, is not to protect employees who disclose classified
information or information prohibited from disclosure by statute. See SENATE REPORT, supra,
at 2730 (explaining purpose of whistleblower statute). Congress also did not intend for sections
2301(b)(9) and 2302(b)(8) to protect employees who claim to be whistleblowers from adverse
action because of the employee's inadequate performance. Id. at 2730-31.
Congress vested the authority to enforce § 2301(b)(9) and § 2302(b)(8) in the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) and Special Counsel. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1204 (1982) (discussing
appointment and removal of MSPB and Special Counsel); 5 U.S.C. § 1205 (1982) (enumerating
powers and functions of MSPB and Special Counsel); 5 U.S.C. § 1206 (1982) (explaining
authority and responsibilities of Special Counsel). The President nominates the Special Counsel
subject to approval by the Senate. See SENATE REPORT, supra, at 2728 (explaining functions of
MSPB and Special Counsel). The Special Counsel receives and investigates allegations of
violations of the merit system and brings violators before the MSPB. Id. at 2728-29. The
President, subject to Senate confirmation, nominates the three member bipartisan MSPB. Id.
at 2728. The MSPB adjudicates alleged violations of the merit system brought to the MSPB by
the Special Counsel and determines the appropriate remedial action. Id. at 2728-29. Unlike the
federal legislature, very few states have enacted statutes offering protection to whistleblowers
at the state level who do not enjoy the protection of the federal whistleblower statute. See Com-
ment, supra at 791. Michigan, Alaska, and California are among the few states that have enacted
statutes protecting whistleblowers at the state level. See MICH. Comp. LAws § 15.361-.369 (1981)
(Whistleblowers' Protection Act). Section 15.362 of the Michigan Whistleblowers' Protection
Act prohibits employers in both the public and private sectors from discharging or otherwise
discriminating against an employee because the employee has reported an unlawful activity to
a public body. Id. at § 15.263; see Comment, supra, at 791 (discussing Michigan's Whistleblowers'
Protection Act). Similarly, § 14.20.095 of the Alaska Code prohibits the enactment of any bylaw
or regulation restricting or modifying a school teacher's right to comment and criticize school
personnel outside school hours. ALAsKA STAT. § 14.20.905 (1982). Similarly, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 10540.-10547 address public employee reporting of improper government activities. CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 10540-10546 (1980). Section 10543 of the California Code prohibits the use of
a threat of reprisal to interfere with the right of the employee to disclose information. Id. at §
10543. Most states, including Virginia, however, have not enacted statutes to protect the
whistleblower. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 871 n.l.
57. Id. at 870-71.
58. Id. at 871.
59. Id. at 881.
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violated Jurgensen's free speech rights and applied the test promulgated by
the Supreme Court in Pickering, Mount Healthy, and Connick.6° The Fourth
Circuit first applied Mount Healthy to determine whether an exercise of
Jurgensen's first amendment rights was the "but for" cause of Jurgensen's
demotion. 6' Under Mount Healthy, Jurgensen's speech had to qualify for
constitutional protection, and had to constitute the "but for" cause for
Jurgensen's demotion.6 The Fourth Circuit found that Jurgensen's removal
and release of the inspection report in knowing violation6 3 of valid depart-
mental regulations constituted insubordination. 64 The Fourth Circuit, there-
fore, concluded that insubordination, and not an exercise of Jurgensen's
first amendment rights, constituted the "but for" cause of Jurgensen's
demotion. 6 The Fourth Circuit further held that insubordination justified
Jurgensen's demotion regardless of whether the inspection report included
matters of public interest.
66
In concluding that insubordination justified Jurgensen's demotion even
if the inspection report involved matters of public concern, the Fourth
Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Connick v. Myers.6 In
Connick, the plaintiff, an Assistant District Attorney, had prepared and
circulated among her co-workers a questionnaire concerning various matters
within the District Attorney's office, including the office transfer policy and
office morale. 6 The Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff's sub-
sequent discharge violated her first amendment free speech rights. 69 In
determining whether the discharge infringed on the plaintiff's free speech
rights, the Supreme Court noted that the employer in Connick considered
the questionnaire an act of insubordination that disrupted working relation-
ships within the office.7
0
60. Id. at 871-89; see supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text (discussing test established
by Supreme Court in Pickering, Mount Healthy and Connick).
61. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 880-88.
62. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287 (discussing test that public employee must satisfy in
order to state valid cause of action for violation of first amendment rights); see Jurgensen, 745
F.2d at 880-81 (illustrating Fourth Circuit's application of Mount Healthy); see also supra note
15 (explaining "but for" requirement of Mount Healthy).
63. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 883. The Jurgensen court concluded that Jurgensen not only
violated departmental regulations, but that Jurgensen knowingly violated the regulations. Id.;
see supra note 40 (discussing departmental regulations). The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
Department presumed Jurgensen's familiarity with departmental regulations. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d
at 883. In addition, in his own testimony, Jurgensen revealed that he knew that only certain
department employees had the authority to release department documents. Id. Furthermore, the
Fourth Circuit recognized that the Washington Post reporter had alerted Jurgensen that the Depart-
ment viewed the inspection report as confidential. Id.
64. Id. at 883.
65. Id. at 887.
66. Id. at 882.
67. Id.; see Connick, 461 U.S. at 141, 151 (discussing insubordination); see supra note 17
(discussing Supreme Court's decision in Connick).
68. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141.
69. Id. at 146-54.
70. Id. at 141.
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The Connick Court reasoned that since the employee's questionnaire
involved matters of public concern in" only a limited sense, the first amend-
ment did not require the employer to tolerate conduct that the employer
reasonably believed would cause discord within the office. 7' The Supreme
Court concluded, therefore, that the plaintiff's discharge did not violate the
first amendment. 72 The Fourth Circuit relied on Connick as a decision
sustaining the employee's discharge on the basis of insubordination, even
though the employee's questionnaire involved, in part, a matter of public
concern.7 1 In fact, the Fourth Circuit found that Jurgensen's conduct in
removing and releasing the inspection report was similar to the employee's
conduct of preparing and distributing the questionnaire in Connick, and
concluded that the evidence of insubordination in Jurgensen was more
compelling than the evidence of insubordination in Connick.7 4 The Fourth
Circuit considered Connick clear authority for justifying Jurgensen's demo-
tion on the basis of insubordination.7 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, con-
cluded that because Jurgensen's removal and release of the inspection report
71. Id. at 152. Cf. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1983)
(requiring actual, not imagined, disruption of close working relationships to justify employee's
dismissal for speaking on matters involving public concern).
72. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
73. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 882 n.21 (concluding that Supreme Court in Connick
upheld discharge of employee on basis of insubordination); Connick, 461 U.S. at 141 (discussing
distribution of questionnaire as insubordination).
74. Id. at 883-84. In concluding that Jurgensen presented a stronger case of insubordi-
nation than Connick, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that Connick, unlike Jurgensen did not
involve an express regulation proscribing the employee's conduct. Id. The Connick Court did
not find any showing that the employee in Connick knew that her conduct violated a
departmental regulation. Id. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit compared the fact that while the
employee in Connick could claim the questionnaire as her property, the inspection report in
Jurgensen constituted departmental property. Id. at 888.
75. Id. at 888; see Connick 461 U.S. at 141, 151 (discussing insubordination). In addition
to Connick, the Fourth Circuit relied on the Merit Systems Protection Board's (MSPB) decision
in Special Counsel v. Department of State to uphold Jurgensen's demotion as disciplinary action
based on insubordination. Id. at 882; Special Counsel v. Department of State, 9 M.S.P.B. 14, 14-
16 (1982); see also supra note 54 (discussing role and function of MSPB). In Special Counsel,
the MSPB considered the statutory free speech rights of a federal employee charged with
insubordination. See Special Counsel, 9 M.S.P.B. at 14-16. The employee in Special Counsel
had removed government files from the New York Passport Office (NYPA) in an attempt to
disclose corruption within the NYPA. Id. at 15. The NYPA suspended and transferred the
employee based on charges of removal of government files and insubordination. Id. The
employee sought unsuccessfully protection under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Id. at 15-16; see 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (1982) (federal statute protecting whistleblowers); see also supra note 56
(discussing 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)). Applying Mount Healthy the MSPB concluded that the
employee's attempt to disclose corruption through the removal of files constituted whistleblowing
which warranted protection under § 2302(b)(8). Id. at 16. The MSPB concluded, however, that
although the employee's whistleblowing may have influenced the NYPA's decision to suspend
and transfer the employee, insubordination was the motivating factor in the employee's
suspension and transfer. Id. at 16. The MSPB, therefore, upheld the suspension and transfer
on the basis of insubordination. Id. Thus, the Fourth Circuit found support for Jurgensen's
demotion in Jurgensen by reasoning that Jurgensen's act of insubordination equated exactly
with the employee's act of insubordination in Special Counsel. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 882.
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constituted insubordination and that because insubordination justified Jur-
gensen's demotion, the demotion did not violate Jurgensen's first amendment
right to free speech.
7 6
In upholding Jurgensen's demotion on the basis of insubordination, the
Fourth Circuit emphasized the validity of the Department regulations that
Jurgensen had violated.7 7 The Jurgensen court stated that General Order 401
which Jurgensen violated when he released the inspection report without
authorization provided a procedure for the orderly processing of document
requests.78 Recognizing a law enforcement agency's special need for an
established procedure governing the release and disclosure of reports and
documents, the Fourth Circuit held that General Order 401 was a valid
regulation.7 9 In upholding the validity of General Order 401 the Fourth
Circuit emphasized that the regulation, as applied in Jurgensen, did not
violate Jurgensen's free speech rights because the Department did not at-
tempt, through application of the regulation, to deny Jurgensen the right to
speak freely on his views concerning conditions within the EOC. 0 The Fourth
Circuit further reasoned that to disregard Jurgensen's knowing violation of
departmental regulations would encourage other employees to violate regu-
lations and, consequently, would disrupt discipline within the EOC.8 ' The
Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the Jurgensen holding would establish
important precedent on the issue of insubordination, and expressed concern
that a holding providing first amendment protection to Jurgensen's disregard
of departmental regulations would encourage disgruntled public employees
to purloin and publish any type of public records under the claim that the
documents involved matters of public interest.82 The Fourth Circuit concluded
that because Jurgensen's demotion was the result of a knowing violation of
a valid regulation, a violation of Jurgensen's free speech right was not the
"but for" cause of Jurgensen's demotion.83 The Fourth Circuit, therefore,
held that Jurgensen's failure to satisfy the "but for" standard of Mount
Healthy required the district court to dismiss Jurgensen's case.'
4
76. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 887.
77. Id. at 881. The Jurgensen court emphasized that the validity of the regulation, not
the contents of the inspection report, posed the first issue for the Fourth Circuit to resolve. Id.
78. Id. at 887 n.30; see supra note 40 (discussing General Order No. 401).
79. Id. at 884.
80. Id. at 884 n.27.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 887.
84. Id. at 880-81; see Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287 (discussing "but for" requirement);
see also supra note 15 (same). The Jurgensen court noted that the district court had submitted
resolution of the Pickering balancing test to the jury. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 880-81, 881 n.20;
see Pickering 391 U.S. at 568 (discussing balancing test). The Fourth Circuit stated, however,
that under Connick the question of whether speech qualifies for first amendment protection is
a question of law, not fact. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 880-81, 881 n.20; see Connick, 461 U.S. at
148 n.7 (protected speech status is a question of law). Since the Fourth Circuit felt that the
court could decide Jurgensen under the "but for" standard of Mount Healthy, the Fourth
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Although the Fourth Circuit found that the Mount Healthy "but for"
standard was dispositive of Jurgensen's first amendment claim, the Fourth
Circuit analyzed the facts of Jurgensen's demotion under the Pickering
balancing test to determine whether Jurgensen's conduct qualified for first
amendment protection.15 Assuming that the publication of the inspection
report constituted an exercise of free speech rights, the Jurgensen court
reasoned that because the report dealt with internal office policy and did not
reveal any potential wrongdoing, the report involved matters of only limited
public concern. 6 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, concluded that because the
Department's interest in preventing disruption within the Department out-
weighed Jurgensen's free speech rights, Jurgensen's conduct did not warrant
first amendment protection.8
In contrast to the majority's opinion, the dissent in Jurgensen concluded
that the inspection report addressed a matter of public concern.88 The dissent
reasoned that Jurgensen's interest, as a citizen, in releasing the report to the
press outweighed the interest of the county, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the EOC.89 With regard to the general order restricting the
release of information to the press, the dissent reasoned that the county
incorrectly equated whistleblowing with insubordination." The dissent, there-
fore, disagreed with the majority's holding that the violation of the depart-
mental regulation established conclusively that Jurgensen's conduct did not
come under the protection of the first amendment. 9'
The Fourth Circuit in Jurgensen properly concluded that Jurgensen's
failure to satisfy the "but for" standard of Mount Healthy required the
district court to dismiss Jurgensen's claim that his demotion by the Fairfax
County Police Department officials violated his first amendment right to
free speech. 92 The Fourth Circuit correctly found that Jurgensen's removal
Circuit declined to remand the case to the district court to apply the Pickering balancing test.
Jurgensen at 881, 881 n.20.
85. Id. at 888-89; see supra note 9 (discussing Pickering balancing test).
86. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 88.
87. Id. at 888-89.
88. Id. at 893 (Butzner, J., dissenting). The dissent in Jurgensen reasoned that in addition to
corruption, which is clearly a matter of public concern, deficiencies in personnel, training, equipment,
and adequate financing which were addressed in the inspection report, also involve matters of
public concern. Id. at 895..
89. Id. at 894.
90. Id.
91. Id. The dissent in Jurgensen reasoned that while Jurgensen's violation of the regulation
could not establish decisively that the first amendment did not protect Jurgensen's conduct,
Jurgensen's conduct weighs in as a factor in the court's application of the Pickering balancing
test. Id. Furthermore, the dissent in Jurgensen argued that Jurgensen's disclosure of the
inspection report did not disrupt the efficient operation of the EOC. Id.
92. See id. at 887. In Jurgensen, the Fourth Circuit correctly interpreted Mount Healthy
to establish a two-part test, both parts of which a plaintiff-employee must satisfy in order to
establish a valid cause of action under the first amendment. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 887; see
Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287 (requiring employee to show that speech or conduct qualified
for first amendment protection, and that constitutionally protected speech or conduct was
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and release of the inspection report constituted insubordination, 93 and that
insubordination, not an exercise of Jurgensen's first amendment free speech
rights, constituted the "but for" cause of Jurgensen's demotion.94 The
Supreme Court's decision in Connick supports the Fourth Circuit's conclu-
sion that the Department's interest in preventing disruption within the
Department permitted the demotion of Jurgensen for insubordination."
Additionally, decisions from the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
96
support the Jurgensen court's holding that a finding of insubordination
justified Jurgensen's demotion regardless of whether the inspection report
involved matters of public concern. 97 The United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals disagree, however, whether a finding of insubordination automati-
cally excludes a public employee from first amendment protection.98 Some
motivating factor in employer's decision not to rehire employee); see also Givhan, 439 U.S. at
417 (refining Mount Healthy motivating factor requirement to a "but for" standard); supra
note 15 (discussing Mount Healthy and Givhan).
93. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 883 (recognizing that Jurgensen's conduct constituted
insubordination). Insubordination is the refusal by an employee to obey the lawful instruction
of his employer. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 120 (5th ed. 1979); see Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 883.
In Jurgensen, the Fourth Circuit classifies accurately Jurgensen's conduct of removing and
releasing the inspection report as insubordination by recognizing Jurgensen's conduct as a
knowing violation of a valid regulation imposed on Jurgensen as a condition of his employment.
Id; see supra notes 40, 63 (discussing Jurgensen's violation of the departmental regulations).
94. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 881 (concluding that insubordination constituted the "but
for" cause of Jurgensen's demotion). In Jurgensen, the Fourth Circuit recognized that all
parties in the district court, including Jurgensen, conceded that Jurgensen's removal and release
of the inspection report caused his demotion. Id. The district judge in Jurgensen gave the
plaintiff's counsel an opportunity to introduce other factors, other than the removal and release
of the inspection report to explain why the Department took disciplinary action against
Jurgensen. Id. The failure of the plaintiff's counsel to recall the witness or to argue any other
reason for the demotion supports the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the unauthorized removal
and release of the inspection report, not an exercise of Jurgensen's first amendment rights,
constituted the "but for" cause of Jurgensen's demotion). Id.
95. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 882; see Connick, 461 U.S. at 152. In Connick, the Supreme
Court held that a public employer does not have to wait until an employee's speech or conduct
actually disrupts the office before dismissing the employee. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152. Thus,
the Department's fear that tolerance of Jurgensen's violation of regulations would create a real
likelihood that all department employees' respect for regulations would diminish significantly,
justified the Department's disciplinary action against Jurgensen on the basis of insubordination.
See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 885 (Fourth Circuit's application of Connick justifying Jurgensen's
demotion); see also supra note 17 and text accompanying notes 67-72 (discussing Connick).
96. See supra note 56 (discussing MSPB).
97. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 882; see Special Counsel v. Department of State, 9 M.S.P.B.
at 16 (dismissal of public employee upheld since employee's act of insubordination formed
basis for dismissal); supra note 75 (discussing Special Counsel)
98. See Berry v. Bailey, 726 F.2d 670, 674 (11th Cir. 1984) (employee fired for insubor-
dination warrants no first amendment protection), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2326 (1985); infra
notes 101-08 and accompanying text (discussing Berry). But see Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass
Consortium, 769 F.2d 1251, 1259 (7th Cir. 1985) (insubordination is only one factor to consider
in determining whether employee warrants first amendment protection); see infra notes 113-22
and accompanying text (discussing Patkus).
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circuits are unwilling to permit a finding of insubordination to automatically
remove an employee's speech or conduct from first amendment protection.9
Consistent with the Fourth Circuit's holding in Jurgensen, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded in Berry v.
Bailey' that a finding of insubordination automatically excludes a public
employee's speech or conduct from first amendment protection, even if the
speech or conduct involves a matter of public concern.10' In Berry, the
Eleventh Circuit considered whether a sheriff had violated the first amend-
ment rights of a deputy sheriff by terminating the deputy's employment after
the deputy refused to obey orders from the sheriff.'0 2 The deputy brought a
civil rights action against the sheriff claiming that the deputy's discharge
violated his first amendment rights.'0 3 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged
that the deputy's motivation in refusing to obey the sheriff's orders stemmed
from his desire to expose corruption within the sheriff's department.'04 The
Eleventh Circuit reasoned, however, that although corruption within the
sheriff's office is a matter of public concern, if the sheriff fired the deputy
for insubordination, the deputy warranted no first amendment protection. 05
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the deputy's refusal to obey the sheriff's
orders constituted insubordination.:0 Because the deputy's discharge resulted
from insubordination and not from an exercise of free speech rights, the
Berry court held that the deputy's discharge did not violate the deputy's first
99. See Berry v. Bailey, 726 F.2d 670, 674 (1lth Cir. 1984) (employee fired for insubor-
dination warrants no first amendment protection); infra notes 101-08 (discussing Berry).
100. 726 F.2d 670 (1lth Cir. 1984).
101. See Berry, 726 F.2d at 674 (deputy Sheriff's dismissal upheld because based on
insubordination).
102. Id. at 673-76. In Berry, Berry performed well as a deputy, but Berry's involvement in
FBI undercover operations and refusal to favor the sheriff's political supporters led to Berry's
discharge. Id. at 671-72. The event which ultimately resulted in Berry's discharge involved the
arrest of members of a wedding party at a restaurant following a wedding rehearsal dinner. Id.
at 672. When Berry and other deputies arrived at the restaurant, a fight broke out and the deputies
made several arrests. Id. Among those arrested was the daughter of Judge Smith. Id. Judge Smith
was a political supporter of the sheriff. Id. After a visit from Judge Smith regarding his
daughter's arrest, the sheriff instructed Berry to drop the charges against Judge Smith's daughter
and the other women arrested to avoid a showing of favoritism toward Judge Smith's daughter.
Id. After Berry refused to heed the sheriff's order to drop the charges against the political
supporter's daughter and others, the sheriff fired Berry. Id. The sheriff explained that his
political supporters had informed him that the sheriff would lose the next election if Berry
remained on the payroll. Id.
103. Id. at 673. In Berry, Berry claimed that the speech and action between Berry and the
sheriff regarding the events surrounding the arrest of Judge Smith's daughter constituted
constitutionally protected speech, and that the sheriff fired Berry for exercising his first
amendment speech rights. Id. at 674. The Eleventh Circuit, however, concluded that under
Pickering, Berry failed to demonstrate that his speech qualified for first amendment protection.
Id. at 674-75.
104. Id. at 676.
105. Id. at 674.
106. Id. at 676.
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amendment rights. 107 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion in Berry sup-
ports the Fourth Circuit's holding in Jurgensen that a finding of insubordi-
nation automatically excludes a public employee's speech or conduct from
first amendment protection, even if the speech or conduct constitutes a
matter of public concern.1'°
Unlike the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit does not allow a finding of insubordination
to automatically exclude an employee's speech or conduct from first amend-
ment protection. 1 9 Rather than focusing on the employee's act of insubor-
dination, the Seventh Circuit considers the disruption that results from the
employee's act of insubordination in determining whether the employee's
speech or conduct involving a matter of public concern warrants first
amendment protection.Y0 The disruptive effect of the employee's speech or
conduct becomes a factor in the Pickering balancing equation." ' For exam-
ple, in Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium,"2 the Seventh Circuit consid-
ered whether the disruptive impact of a public employee's speech excluded
the employee's speech from first amendment protection even though the
speech involved matters of significant public concern." 3 In Patkus, Patkus,
was the administrator of the Sangamon-Cass Consortium, an agency respon-
sible for the administration of the Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act (CETA) program for two counties in Illinois.1 4 Concerned that an
investigation within the agency was not proceeding in compliance with federal
regulations," 5 Patkus and several other staff members sent a telegram to the
United States Department of Labor (DOL) listing specific charges against
107. Id. at 674. The Berry court emphasized that although the court did not condone the
manner in which the sheriff operated the sheriff's department, or the sheriff's firing of Berry,
Berry's refusal to obey the sheriff's order did not fall within the protection of by the first
amendment. Id. at 675. The Eleventh Circuit in Berry reasoned that courts cannot encourage
employees to disregard orders every time the employee feels the employer is not managing the
office properly. Id. at 676.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06 (insubordination justified deputy's dis-
missal notwithstanding fact that deputy's conduct involved matter of public concern).
109. See Patkus v. Sangaman-Cass Consortium, 769 F.2d 1251, 1259-60 (7th Cir. 1985)
(insubordination is only one factor in determining first amendment rights of public employee);
infra notes 113-21 (discussing Patkus).
110. See Patkus, 769 F.2d at 1258-59 (7th Cir. 1985) (disruption caused by insubordination
becomes factor determining whether employee warrants first amendment protection); see infra
text accompanying notes 111-19 (illustrating how courts balance disruption caused by insubor-
dination when employee speaks on matter of public concern). See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568
(explaining balancing test).
111. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (explaining balancing test); see also infra text accom-
panying notes 112-19 (illustrating how disruption caused by insubordination becomes factor in
Pickering balancing equation).
112. 769 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1985).
113. Id. at 1257.
114. Id. at 1254. In Patkus, Patkus' duties as administrator of the Consortium included
managing and supervising the regular business of the Consortium and maintaining contact with
other state and federal CETA offices. Id.
115. Id. In Patkus the investigation involved a complaint filed with the United States
Department of Labor (DOL) filed against Patkus by a Consortium employee. Id. The DOL
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the employee conducting the investigation. ' 6 Classifying Patkus' conduct as
insubordination, the state discharged Patkus." 7 Patkus claimed that the
discharge violated her free speech rights because the telegram came under
the protection of the first amendment."' The Seventh Circuit acknowledged
that Patkus' conduct involved an important matter of public concern and
applied Pickering to the employee's claim by balancing the disruptive effect
of the employee's insubordinate conduct with the employee's first amendment
right to comment on a matter of public concern." 9 The Seventh Circuit
reasoned, however, that even though Patkus' conduct involved an important
matter of public concern, under the Pickering balancing test, Patkus' conduct
was so disruptive of the county agency that the county's interests in avoiding
internal disruption outweighed Patkus' interest in speaking freely.' 2' Thus,
Patkus demonstrates that the balancing approach represents the proper ap-
plication of the test established by the Supreme Court's decisions in Picker-
ing, Mount Healthy, and Connick to determine whether a public employer
has violated the first amendment rights of a public employee.' 2 ' Additionally,
Patkus illustrates that in the application of the Pickering balancing test, disrup-
tion resulting from insubordination likely will outweigh the employee's in-
terest in speaking freely.
2 2
Although when weighed as a factor in the Pickering equation, the
disruptive impact of an employee's speech or conduct involving matters of
public concern frequently excludes the speech or conduct from first amend-
ment protection, the Seventh Circuit's decision in O'Brien v. Town of
Caledonia'23 illustrates that the government's interest in preventing disruption
of internal discipline cannot outweigh in every instance a public employee's
first amendment right to speak freely. 24 In O'Brien, the plaintiff, a police
regarded the complaint against Patkus as a personnel matter and recommended that the
Consortium designate a hearing officer to investigate the employee's complaint against Patkus.
Id. Upon the DOL's request, the state agency appointed a hearing officer to investigate the
complaint according to federal regulations governing internal agency investigations. Id. at 1254-
55.
116. Id. In Patkus, the telegram to the DOL expressed the Consortium staff's concerns
about the political involvement of the hearing officer investigating the complaint against Patkus.
Id.
117. Id. at 1255-56.
118. Id. at 1256.
119. Id. at 1257-59.
120. Id. at 1259. The Patkus court emphasized that even though Patkus spoke about a
matter of public concern, Patkus' conduct in sending the telegram constituted highly disruptive,
conflict-creating behavior. Id.
121. See id. at 1258-59 (illustrating Seventh Circuit's application of Pickering balancing
test); Pickering, 361 U.S. at 568; Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287; Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
122. See Patkus, 769 F.2d at 1258-59 (under Pickering, disruptive impact of Patkus'
conduct outweighed Patkus' free speech rights); see also Derrickson v. Board of Educ. of City
of St. Louis, 738 F.2d 351, 353 (8th Cir. 1984) (disruptive manner of employee's criticism
outweighed employee's right to criticize even assuming criticism involved matter of public
concern).
123. 748 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984)
124. See id. at 407 (government cannot insulate itself from public scrutiny through
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officer, claimed that the Caledonia Police Department unlawfully had dis-
missed him in retaliation for discussing graft and corruption within the police
department with his attorney, the local district attorney, the county circuit
court judge, the FBI and the media.'2 5 The Caledonia Police Department
defended the disciplinary actions taken against O'Brien, arguing that O'Brien
had violated section X-4 of the caledonia Police Department manual govern-
ing confidentiality of information.2 6 O'Brien argued that the Department's
application of section X-4 violated his first amendment right to discuss graft
and corruption within the Department and requested a preliminary injunction
against the implementation of disciplinary proceedings against him for
violating section X-4.1 27 Reasoning that O'Brien had a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits of his claim regarding the application of section X-
4, the Seventh Circuit ordered entry of the preliminary injunction. 2 Applying
the Pickering balancing test, the O'Brien court concluded that O'Brien's
interest in exposing graft and corruption outweighed the Department's
interest in maintaining discipline through the enforcement of section X-4. 129
The Seventh Circuit, therefore, concluded that the Department's application
of the departmental regulation to O'Brien infringed upon O'Brien's first
amendment free speech right. 30 Rather than viewing O'Brien's violation of
departmental regulations as insubordination that automatically excluded
O'Brien's conduct from consideration under the Pickering balancing test, as
the Fourth Circuit did in Jurgensen, the Seventh Circuit in O'Brien considered
O'Brien's violation of the departmental regulation as well as the Depart-
ment's application of the departmental regulation to O'Brien as factors to
weigh in the Pickering equation.' 3' Thus, notwithstanding the fact that
regulations declaring all official business confidential); infra notes 125-36 and accompanying
text (discussing O'Brien).
125. Id. at 405. In O'Brien, O'Brien sought a preliminary injunction against the contin-
uation of disciplinary proceedings against him for violating section X-4 of the Calendonia Police
Department Manual. Id. at 403.
126. Id. at 405. In O'Brien, Section X-4 of the Calendonia Police Department Manual
required department employees to treat the official business of the department as confidential.
Id. The major focus of the Department's internal investigation of O'Brien's conduct was
whether O'Brien's communications with his attorney, the local district attorney, the county
circuit judge, the FBI, and the media had violated section X-4. Id. A prior investigation
conducted by the FBI had revealed no criminal conduct. Id. In addition to section X-4, the
Seventh Circuit in O'Brien found sections V-A-i and 5 of the Calendonia Police Department
Manual unconstitutional because sections V-A-I and 5 prohibited all criticism of the Department
regardless of the context or public interest involved. Id. at 406.
127. Id. at 404. The Department retaliated against O'Brien through incommunicado
interrogations, disciplinary proceedings, and other forms of harassment.
128. Id. at 409.
129. Id. at 407. The O'Brien court held that O'Brien's perception of graft and corruption
within the Department deserved vigilant first amendment protection. Id; see Pickering, 391 U.S.
at 568 (explaining balancing test). Additionally, the Seventh Circuit in O'Brien asserted that the
public has a substantial interest in serious governmental misconduct. O'Brien, 748 F.2d at 407.
130. Id. at 407.
131. Id; Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 887; see Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (describing balancing
test).
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O'Brien had violated a departmental regulation, through the application of
the Pickering balancing test, the Seventh Circuit determined that O'Brien's
speech involving a matter of public concern warranted first amendment
protection.
3 2
The result of the Seventh Circuit's balancing of interests in O'Brien
illustrates that the application of the Pickering balancing test protects more
effectively the first amendment rights of a public employee who comments
on a matter of public concern, than does the Fourth Circuit's approach of
automatically excluding speech or conduct from consideration under Pick-
ering upon a finding of insubordination, even if the speech or conduct
involves a matter of public concern. 33 For example, under the Jurgensen
analysis, a claim by the Caledonia Police Department in O'Brien that
O'Brien's violation of a valid departmental regulation constituted insubor-
dination automatically would exclude O'Brien's speech or conduct from first
amendment protection, even though the departmental regulation infringed
upon O'Brien's first amendment free speech rights.'34 As O'Brien illustrates,
however, insubordination may not always constitute the "but for" cause of
disciplinary action against a public employee. 35 Rather, a public employer
may attempt to use the label of insubordination as a pretext for suppression
of a public employee's right to comment on matters of public concern.
3 6
Because insubordination may not always constitute the "but for" cause of
an employee's demotion or discharge in situations involving speech or
conduct of public concern, courts should apply the Pickering balancing test in
order to protect adequately the public employee's first amendment rights. 
7
Through balancing, courts can protect the public employee in situations in
which insubordination does not constitute the "but for" cause of the
employee's demotion or discharge by allowing the public employee's first
amendment right to comment on matters of public concern to outweigh the
effect of the employee's act of insubordination."" Thus, when a public
employee's speech or conduct involves a matter of public concern, the
balancing of interests under Pickering is a better approach to protecting the
132. See O'Brien, 748 F.2d at 407 (Seventh Circuit's application of Pickering balancing
test); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (explaining balancing test).
133. See O'Brien, 748 F.2d at 407 (Seventh Circuit's application of Pickering balancing
test); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (explaining balancing test); see also infra notes 134-39 and
accompanying text (explaining that balancing approach extends more effective protection to a
public employee whose speech or conduct involves public concern).
134. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 882 (insubordination justified demotion even if inspection
report involved matter of public concern); see also O'Brien 748 F.2d at 407 (Seventh Circuit's
discussion of disruption caused by O'Brien's violation of regulation).
135. See O'Brien, 748 F.2d at 409 (application of regulation to O'Brien infringed on
O'Brien's free speech rights).
136. Id.
137. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (explaining balancing test); see also infra text accom-
panying note 136 (illustrating how court could infringe on first amendment rights simply by
labeling employee's conduct as insubordination).
138. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (explaining balancing test).
19861
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
free speech rights of public employees than automatically excluding a free
speech claim on the basis of insubordination.1
39
The need for the balancing approach as applied by the Seventh Circuit
in O'Brien does not denigrate, however, the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Jurgensen. 40 Unlike O'Brien's speech in O'Brien, the inspection report in
Jurgensen did not involve a matter of substantial public concern. 4' Addi-
tionally, unlike the Caledonia Police Department in O'Brien, the Fairfax
County Police Department in Jurgensen did not suppress Jurgensen's first
amendment rights through the application of the departmental regulation
governing the release of departmental documents.' 42 Since Jurgensen did not
involve suppression of Jurgensen's free speech rights, 43 the Fourth Circuit
properly concluded that Jurgensen's act of insubordination constituted the
"but for" cause of Jurgensen's demotion, and precluded the need for
application of the Pickering balancing test.'44
Although the Fourth Circuit found that the Mount Healthy "but for"
standard was dispositive of Jurgensen's claim, the Fourth Circuit, relying on
Connick, properly concluded that the inspection report constituted, at most,
139. Id.
140. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 888 (Jurgensen does not involve exercise of free speech
rights); id. at 887 n.30 (departmental regulation did not violate Jurgensen's free speech rights).
In Jurgensen, assuming that Jurgensen had involved the exercise of Jurgensen's first amendment
rights and Jurgensen's conduct had involved a matter of substantial public concern, the
application of the Seventh Circuit's balancing approach to the facts of Jurgensen yields the
same result as the Fourth Circuit's "but for" analysis. See O'Brien, 748 F.2d at 407. Specifically,
although the Fourth Circuit in Juregensen spoke in terms of insubordination, the Jurgensen court
focused primarily on the disruptive impact of Jurgensen's insubordination on discipline within
the EOC. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 884 n.27 (discussing potential for disruption caused by
violations of departmental regulations). Consequently, under Pickering the Fourth Circuit could
protect the Department's interest in discipline by allowing the disruption of discipline caused
by Jurgensen's insubordination to outweigh any first amendment rights arising from Jurgensen's
release of the inspection report. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (illustrating how disrup-
tion caused by employees speech or conduct outweighs employees right to engage in speech or
conduct). In addition to the Department's concern with disruption, the Department's fear that
tolerance of Jurgensen's violation of the regulations would create a real likelihood that all depart-
ment employees' respect for regulations would diminish significantly, justified the Department's
disciplinary action against Jurgensen on the basis of insubordination. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at
888. Moreover, the special character of a police department, in terms of the government's interest
in promoting public confidence in the efficiency of services provided by law enforcement agen-
cies, also supported Jurgensen's demotion. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 880 (emphasizing par-
ticular need of law enforcement agencies to maintain discipline and uniformity); supra note 7
(same). The Fourth Circuit concluded correctly that the Department's need to maintain discipline
and efficiency required a decision from the court to serve as a precedent to deter acts of insubor-
dination by other department employees. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 886 n.29 (emphasizing need
for precedent).
141. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 888 (inspection report did not involve substantial
public concern). But see O'Brien, 748 F.2d at 408 (public's interest in governmental misconduct
is very great).
142. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 887 n.30 (departmental regulation did not violate Jurgen-
sen's free speech rights).
143. Id. at 888.
144. Id. at 887; see Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (explaining balancing test).
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a matter of limited public concern.' 45 Since the inspection report dealt with
internal office policy and not with internal misconduct, the inspection report
did not involve issues of substantial public interest. 46 Furthermore, the
Jurgensen court noted that the inspection report did not constitute a matter
of substantial public concern because the inspection report revealed no illegal
action, no abuse of authority, no corruption or waste and no discrimination
against employees.' 47 Thus, the Fourth Circuit implied that if the inspection
report had revealed governmental illegality and corruption, the inspection
report would have constituted a matter of substantial public concern and
would, presumably, warrant greater first amendment protection. 4 Other
circuits agree with the Fourth Circuit in Jurgensen that illegality, corruption,
and wrongdoing within a government agency are matters of substantial
public concern. 1
49
Because misconduct within a government agency is a matter of substantial
public interest, some circuits unlike the Fourth Circuit, discuss explicitly the
issue of the public employee who discloses governmental corruption and
attempt to provide greater first amendment protection to a public employee
who discloses such governmental corruption.1 50 A public employee who
reports corruption, illegality, or wrongdoing within the government agency
for which he works is a "whistleblower,"'' and as a whistleblower, absent
statutory protection, the employee must depend on the first amendment for
protection against reprisal by his employer. 52 Consequently, in Brockell v.
Norton,"3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit took
the position that a public employee's first amendment interest is greater
when a public employee acts as a whistleblower exposing governmental
corruption. 54 In Brockell, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the city
officials of Marvell, Arkansas violated a Marvell Police Department employ-
145. Id. at 888. The Jurgensen court correctly noted that under Connick, the inspection
report dealt mainly with internal office policy, and therefore did not constitute a matter of
public concern sufficient to warrant first amendment protection. Id.; see Connick, 461 U.S. at
138, 146-55. The Connick Court characterized the employee's questionnaire in Connick as a
grievance from an employee concerning internal office policy that warranted only limited first
amendment protection. Id. at 154; see supra note 17 (discussing Connick).
146. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 888.
147. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 871 (report was simply internal administrative review); id.
at 872 (noting complete absence of critical comment in report); see also supra text accompanying
notes 27-29 (describing contents of internal inspection report).
148. Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 871.
149. See Berry v. Bailey, 726 F.2d 670, 676 (11th Cir. 1984) (corruption of sheriff's office
is matter of public concern); Rookard v. Health and Hosps., Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir.
1983) (court protects reports of corruption and waste).
150. See Brockell v. Norton, 732 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir. 1984) (public employees first
amendment interest is greater when public employee acts as whistleblower); see infra notes 154-
59 and accompanying text (discussing Brockell).
151. See supra note 56 (discussing whistleblowers).
152. See Comment, supra note 56 at 791 (discussing protection for whistleblowers).
153. 732 F.2d 664 (8th Cir. 1984).
154. Id. at 668.
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ee's free speech rights by dismissing the employee because he had reported
misconduct of a Marvell police officer to a person outside of the Depart-
ment's chain of command. 5 Emphasizing the public importance of the
employee's report of governmental misconduct, the Brockell court charac-
terized the employee's conduct as whistleblowing.' 56 The Eighth Circuit then
applied Pickering by balancing the internal disruption caused by the employ-
ee's disclosure of corruption with the employee's right to disclose the
corruption. 157 Recognizing that a finding of disruption cannot control the
Pickering balancing test when that disruption resulted from the disclosure of
corruption, the Brockell court concluded that the employee's conduct war-
ranted first amendment protection. 5 8 As Brockell illustrates, the Eighth
Circuit attempts to extend greater protection to the public employee who
acts as a whistleblower because of the significant public interest in govern-
mental corruption. 5 9
In addition to the agreement among the circuits that governmental
corruption is a matter of significant public concern,160 most circuits agree
that speech or conduct involving matters of only personal interest to the
individual employee do not constitute a matter of public concern.' 6' For
155. Id. at 665-69. In Brockell, Brockell reported his belief that a fellow officer possessed
a copy of a certification test given by the Arkansas State Law Enforcement Standards
Commission. Id. at 665.
156. Id. at 668.
157. Id. at 667-68.
158. Id. at 668.
159. Id.; see also Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 1423 (8th Cir. 1983) (recognizing
that disruption cannot control Pickering balancing test when such disruption results from public
employee acting as whistleblower exposing corruption), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984). In
addition to the Eighth Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Murray v. Gardner attempted to provide greater protection for the whistleblower by
distinguishing between speech that merely expresses a public employee's dissatisfaction with
internal management policy and speech that allows society to form an opinion regarding the
internal operations of governmental agencies. Murray v. Gardner, 741 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1748 (1985). In Murray, the D.C. Circuit considered the first
amendment rights of an FBI agent who claimed that the FBI violated his free speech rights by
disciplining him for criticizing the FBI's employee layoff procedure. Id. at 437-39. The D.C.
Circuit reasoned that the agent's criticism of the agency's layoff procedure amounted to no
more than the typical employee complaint that management acted incompetently. Id. at 438.
The D.C. Circuit, therefore, held that the agent's remarks did not constitute a matter of public
concern. Id. The D.C. Circuit concluded that although the role of the whistleblower warrants
protection, the discontented employee's expressions of personal dissatisfaction do not. Id.
160. See supra note 149 (illustrating that circuits agree that corruption is matter of public
concern).
161. See e.g., Day v. South Park Indep. School Dist., 768 F.2d 696, 700-01 (5th Cir. 1985)
(teachers complaint about principal's evaluation of her did not warrant first amendment
protection because complaint concerned private matter); Alinovi v. Worcester School Comm.,
766 F.2d 660, 671 (Ist Cir. 1985) (resolution of personnel problem between teacher and her
employer is not matter of public concern); Renfroe v. Kirkpatrick, 722 F.2d 714, 715 (1Ith Cir.
1984) (teacher's grievance concerning school board's decision not to rehire her did not constitute
matter of public concern), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 98 (1984); see infra notes 163-68 and
accompanying text (discussing Day and Alinovi).
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example, in Day v. South Park Independent School District,'6 2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether a school
district violated an untenured school teacher's first amendment rights by not
renewing the teacher's contract after she challenged the principal's unfavor-
able evaluation of her teaching performance. 6 3 The Fifth Circuit reasoned
that the teacher's complaint regarding the school district's decision not to
renew her contract constituted a purely private matter and did not involve a
matter of public concern. 64 The Day court, therefore, concluded that the
teacher's complaint about the principal's evaluation of her teaching perform-
ance did not constitute protected speech under the first amendment .
6
Similarly, in Alinovi v. Worcester School Committee'" the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the resolution of a personnel
problem between a school teacher and her employer is not a matter of public
concern. 67 Thus, Day and Alinovi illustrate that the circuits generally refuse
to classify employee grievances that affect only the employee's own employ-
ment as matters of public concern.'
6
Although the circuits agree that speech or conduct of a purely personal
nature do not constitute matters of public concern, and that speech or
conduct concerning governmental corruption do constitute matters of sub-
stantial public concern, factual situations arise in which a public employee's
speech or conduct involves more than a personal grievance but does not
reveal governmental corruption. 6 9 Public employee speech that does not
constitute either a personal grievance or a report of governmental corruption
illustrates the existence of a grey area in which no clear guidelines exist for
determining whether the employee's speech or conduct constitutes a matter
162. 768 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1985).
163. Id. at 697-701.
164. Id. at 700-01.
165. Id.
166. 766 F.2d 660 (1st Cir. 1985).
167. Id. at 671. In Alinovi, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
considered whether a teacher's posting of letters she received from the school administration on
Parents' Night constituted a matter of public concern warranting first amendment protection.
Id. at 670-71. In Alinovi, a school teacher refused to give the school principal a copy of a
paper the teacher had written about a student in the teacher's class. Id. at 662. On Parents'
Night, the teacher posted letters to her from the school administration regarding the teacher's
refusal to give a copy of the term paper to the principal. Id. School officials disciplined the
teacher for posting the letters on Parents' Night. Id. The teacher claimed that the disciplinary
action taken against her by the school officials violated her first amendment free speech right.
Id. Relying on Connick, the First Circuit reasoned that the teacher's desire to resolve her own
disciplinary problem motivated her to post the letters. Id. at 671. The Alinovi court characterized
the teacher's conduct as the resolution of a personnel problem that did not constitute a matter
of public concern and,*therefore, denied the teacher's claim to first amendment protection. Id.
168. See Day, 768 F.2d at 706.01 (persoaal matters do not warrant first amendment protec-
tion); Alinovi, 766 F.2d at 671 (same); see also supra 163-68 and accompanying text (discussing
Day and Aiinovi).
169. See infra notes 170-80 and accompanying text (illustrating speech or conduct that
involves more than individual employee dissatisfaction but does not involve governmental
corruption).
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of public concern.1 70 For example, the inspection report in Jurgensen falls
into this grey area. 17 Although the inspection report recommended increases
in staffing, equipment, and funds for the EOC, the Fourth Circuit classified
the report's recommendations as primarily dealings with internal office
policy. 172 The Fourth Circuit concluded, that since the inspection report
involved internal office policy and not internal governmental corruption, the
inspection report did not constitute a matter of substantial public concern.'73
As the dissent in Jurgensen correctly noted, however, although deficiencies
in equipment, staffing, and financing are less culpable than corruption, such
deficiencies also hamper public services.' 7"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Anderson v. Central Point School District No. 6'15 demonstrates the lower
courts' difficulty in distinguishing clearly between matters of general interest
and matters of public concern. 7 6 In Anderson, the Ninth Circuit considered
whether a school district violated a teacher-coach's first amendment rights
by suspending him for writing a letter to the school board regarding the
athletic policies of the school district. "7 The court in Anderson acknowledged
that the athletic program was at that time a matter of public debate.'78
Applying Connick, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that although the letter
contained some details not involving matters of public interest, the athletic
program itself constituted the subject matter of the letter. 7 The Anderson
court concluded, therefore, that the letter constituted a matter of public
concern. 80
Anderson and Jurgensen illustrate the lack of clear guidelines for deter-
mining whether a public employee's speech or conduct constitutes a matter
of public concern.' 8' Although the Supreme Court's decision in Connick
170. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. Although the Supreme Court's decision in Connick
requires courts to deny first amendment protection to speech that does not involve matters of
political or social interest or concern to the community, the Connick decision offers little
guidance to the lower courts in determining what speech falls into the category of community
interest. Id.; see supra note 17 (discussing Connick).
171. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 871 (describing inspection report); see also supra notes 27-
29 and accompanying text (discussing inspection report).
172. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 888 (determining that inspection report did not constitute
matter of substantial public concern).
173. Id.
174. See id. at 895 (Butzner, J., dissenting) (deficiencies in equipment, staffing, and
financing are matters of public concern).
175. 746 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1984).
176. See id. at 506-07 (Ninth Circuit's consideration of whether teacher-coach's letter to
school board involved matter of public concern).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 507.
179. Id.; see Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (first amendment protects only matters of public
concern); see also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (discussing Connick).
180. Id.; see also McGee v. South Pemiscot School Dist. R-V, 712 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1983)
(subject matter of track coach's letter to newspaper had become public issue).
181. See Anderson, 746 F.2d at 507 (teacher's letter to newspaper involved matter of public
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requires courts to determine whether a public employee's speech or conduct
constitutes a matter of public concern on a case by case basis, 82 the myriad
of factual situations that arise involving the free speech rights of public
employees results in confusion and inconsistency as to the extent a public
employer can limit the first amendment rights of public employees., Thus,
through repeated references to the absence of allegations of governmental
corruption in the inspection report, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Jurgensen
implies that public employee speech involving governmental corruption is a
matter of public concern. 84 The Jurgensen opinion, however, offers little
guidance to the lower courts in determining whether public employee speech
not involving corruption constitutes a matter of public concern.1
8 5
In Jurgensen, the Fourth Circuit upheld Jurgensen's demotion on the
basis of insubordination. 8 6 The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that because
insubordination constituted the "but for" cause of Jurgensen's demotion,
the demotion did not violate Jurgensen's first amendment free speech rights
is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Mount Healthy.187 How-
ever, the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that Jurgensen's act of insubordination
justified Jurgensen's demotion irrespective of whether his conduct involved
a matter of public concern is dangerous in terms of possible future ramifi-
cations within the Fourth Circuit.'88 Allowing insubordination to automati-
cally exclude from first amendment protection a public employee's speech
or conduct involving a matter of public concern permits a public employer
to violate the first amendment rights of public employees under the guise of
concern); Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 888 (inspection report did not involve matter of public
concern); see also supra notes 171-80 and accompanying text (discussing Anderson and Jurgen-
sen).
182. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 (Connick Court's refusal to establish general standard
for judging all statements by public employees).
183. See e.g., Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 844 (1st Cir. 1985) (former fire chief's
comments concerning town's fire fighting capabilities constitutionally protected); Knapp v.
Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827, 843 (7th Cir. 1985) (teacher's speech concerning inequitable mileage
allowance for coaches and extent of liability coverage for coaches and parents who transported
student athletes constituted matter of public concern), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 36 (1985);
McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) (probationary police officer's
public criticism of decision not to raise police officers' salary is matter of public concern).
184. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 871 (inspection report found no illegal action, no abuse
of authority and no evidence of corruption); id. at 872 (noting complete absence of critical
comment in inspection report); see also supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing
inspection report).
185. See Jurgensen, 745 F.2d at 888 (Fourth Circuit concluding that under Connick,
inspection report did not qualify for first amendment protection because inspection report dealt
primarily with internal office policy).
186. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's application
of "but for" standard established by Supreme Court in Mount Healthy).
187. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (explaining "but for" standard of Mount
Healthy).
188. See supra notes 99-139 and accompanying text (explaining why balancing disruption
caused by insubordination is better than allowing insubordination to automatically exclude
speech or conduct involving public concern from constitutional protection).
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insubordination. 8 9 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Jurgensen
clearly signals that an employee of a law enforcement agency cannot commit
an act of insubordination, that the agency has a valid reason to proscribe,
and then bring an action seeking protection for the act of insubordination
in the name of the free speech clause of the first amendment. ,90 Furthermore,
while the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that Jurgensen's conduct did not
involve a matter of substantial public interest is consistent with Connick, the
Jurgensen opinion offers little guidance to the lower courts in identifying
public employee speech that does constitute a matter of public concern.' 9'
SARAH BETH PATE
C. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp.: Collateral Estoppel Effect of
a Non-Fair-Employment-Practice Agency Decision in a Subsequent
Title VII Action
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' protects employees from
discriminatory employment practices based on race, color, sex, religion, or
national origin. 2 Title VII vests central administrative authority in the Equal
189. See supra notes 124-36 and accompanying text (illustrating danger that insubordination
may not always be the "but for" cause of employee demotion or discharge).
190. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing Jurgensen and terms of
precedent on issue of insubordination).
191. See Connick at 146-154 (only matters of public concern warrant first amendment
protection); supra note 170 (discussing lack of clear guidelines in Connick for determining what
public employee speech or conduct constitutes matter of public concern); see also supra notes
181-85 and accompanying text (illustrating difficulty of lower courts in determining whether
public employee speech or conduct constitutes matter of public concern).
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975(a-d), 2000a-2000a-6, 2000b-
2000b-3, 200c-2000c-9, 2000d-2000d-4, 2000e-2000e-6 (1976). The purpose of the Civil rights
Act of 1964 was to achieve a peaceful and voluntary settlement of the persistent problems of
racial and religious discrimination and segregation by prohibiting, among other problems,
discriminatory obstacles to the exercise of the right to vote, discriminatory denials of access to
public facilities and discriminatory employment practices. 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2355, 2393-94 (1964). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 established the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976). The purpose of the EEOC is to
address and resolve claims of discriminatory employment practices that allegedly violate Title
VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1976). Congress, however, did not intend the EEOC to supplant
state or local authorities empowered to address and resolve discriminatory employment practices
but instead intended to screen from the EEOC and the federal courts those civil rights problems
that state authorities could settle to the satisfaction of the grievant in a voluntary and localized
manner. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, Iowa, 441 U.S. 750, 760 (1979).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). Congress intended section 2000e-2(a) to prohibit, with
some exceptions, distinctions or differences in employment treatment or favor based on race,
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Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)3 and entrusts to the federal
courts the ultimate responsibility of enforcing the anti-discriminatory provi-
sions.4 Persons aggrieved by allegedly discriminatory employment practices
may file their claims with the EEOC, which will then investigate the claim
and attempt to resolve the dispute through conference, conciliation, and
persuasion.5 If the EEOC finds a claim to be meritless, the EEOC will
dismiss the complaint and inform the claimant of his or her right to institute
a personal action in federal court. 6 Alternatively, if the EEOC finds the
claim to be meritorious and the EEOC's efforts at conciliation fail, the
EEOC may not take further action but must refer the case to the United
States Attorney General who may bring a civil action in federal district court
to enforce the provisions of Title VII. 7 Title VII requires the EEOC and the
federal courts to defer to state or local agencies that have legally conferred
authority to grant or seek relief from such employment discrimination.8
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (April 8, 1964) (interpretative
memorandum of Title VII submitted by Sens. Clark and Case).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976). Congress intended the EEOC to have the power to use
and cooperate with state and local authorities, as well as individuals. 110 CONG. REc. 7213
(April 8, 1964) (interpretative memorandum of Title VII submitted by Sens. Clark and Case).
Congress also intended for the EEOC to furnish conciliation services between employers and
employees. Id. Following the 1972 amendments to Title VII, Congress empowered the EEOC
to file suit on behalf of claimants. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2003e-5(b) & (f) (1976); see Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972-Congress Report, 118 CONG. REc. 7167 (March 6, 1972). In the 1972
amendments, Congress authorized the EEOC to process a charge of adverse employment activity
through the investigative and conciliation stages. Id.; see infra note 4 (EEOC procedure of
claims, conciliation, and resolution). When the respondent employer is a government, a
governmental agency, or a political subdivision, the EEOC may file a civil action against the
respondent in federal district court if the EEOC has been unsuccessful in eliminating the alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.
118 CONG. REc. 7167 (1972).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) & (g) (1976) (United States district courts have jurisdiction
over and power to enforce actions accruing under Title VII). An enforcement proceeding under
Title VII begins with the aggrieved employee, or another person on the employee's behalf, filing
a written charge with the EEOC. Id. at § 2000e-5(b); see infra note 8 (provisions of "deferral
clause"). When the investigation is complete, the EEOC makes a preliminary determination as
to whether probable cause exists to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred;
and, if the EEOC finds cause to believe the claim has merit, the EEOC will attempt to remedy
the situation through conference, conciliation, and persuasion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If the
EEOC finds no reasonable cause to believe the charge is true, the EEOC will dismiss the charge
and notify the claimant and the respondent of the EEOC's action. Id. If the EEOC dismisses
the charge, the EEOC issues to the claimant a "right to sue" letter and the claimant may
pursue a private civil action. Id. at § 2000e-5(f)(1). The "right to sue" letter is a statutory
prerequisite to a private civil action based on a charge of employment discrimination. Id.
5. See supra note 4 (discussing EEOC procedure of investigation, conference and
conciliation).
6. See id. (statutory requirement of right-to-sue letter before claimant may pursue private
civil action for employment discrimination).
7. See id. (EEOC procedure followed when EEOC determines employee has valid unfair
employment practice claim).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) (the "deferral" clause). If a state or local government
has an agency dealing with employment discrimination, the EEOC may not actively process a
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Pursuant to the deferral provisions of Title VII, if a state agency has
addressed a charge of unfair employment practices, the EEOC also may
investigate the truth of the charge, 9 but the EEOC is required to give
"substantial weight" to the findings and orders of state administrative
agencies.' 0 The EEOC is not bound by state administrative findings." If,
however, a state court has reviewed a decision of a state administrative
agency, or conducted a trial de novo, or the state administrative agency has
functioned as a judicial forum in a fair employment case, the federal district
court must grant the same preclusive effect 2 to issues resolved in the state
hearing as the state's own courts would grant.1 3 In Ross v. Communications
Satellite Corp., 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered whether a Maryland state court's determination in an unemploy-
ment compensation proceeding was entitled to receive preclusive effect, based
on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, in a subsequent federal Title VII
employment discrimination action.'5
In Ross, Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) employed
Thomas J. Ross (Ross), a single white male, in its Research and Development
Laboratories between June 8, 1980 and August 24, 1981, when COMSAT
charge of discrimination until the state or local agency has begun its remedial process and 60
days have passed. Id. The state or local agency has exclusive jurisdiction for 60 days. MODJESKA,
HANDLING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CAsEs, 84-85 (1980). If the state or local agency has
not resolved the charge within 60 days, the charging party then may file a charge with the
EEOC. Id.
9. See supra note 4 (EEOC procedure of investigation, conciliation, or dismissal).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
11. Id.; see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 412 U.S. 36, 48 n.8 (1974). The Alexander
Court held that the EEOC must accord substantial weight to the final findings and orders that
state or local authorities make but that the EEOC was not bound by such findings. Id.
12. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 n.6 (1982). The Kremer
Court emphasized the importance of the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata
in fulfilling the purpose of the civil courts, the conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdic-
tion. Id. The principle of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits of an action
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that those parties raised or could
have raised. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). The principle of collateral estoppel
provides that once a court decides an issue of fact or issue of law necessary to the court's
judgment, that decision precludes relitigation of the same issue on a different cause of action
between the same parties. Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979). The
application by the federal courts of the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel to state
court judgments promotes not only judicial efficiency but comity between the state and federal
courts. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).
13. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485 (1983). The Supreme Court in
Kremer noted that any civil action subsequent to consideration of an employment discrimination
charge by federal or state agencies is to be a trial de novo. Id. at 469; see Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 38 (trial de novo not foreclosed by prior submission of claim to
arbitration); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973) (court actions
under Title VII are de novo proceedings).
14. 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1985).
15. Id. at 357.
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discharged Ross.' 6 Ross alleged that in late January 1981, he rejected a sexual
advance made by another employee, Mary L. Penrose (Penrose), a technician
employed in COMSAT's Semiconductor Technology Division. 7 On February
2, 1981, Ross filed with Leonard R. Sparrow, his supervisor, an in-house
sexual harassment and professional misconduct complaint against Penrose. 8
After Ross filed the complaint, COMSAT reorganized Ross' work schedule
so that Ross would not come into direct contact with Penrose,' 9 but Ross
found the arrangement unacceptable. 20 On March 31, Ross filed with the
EEOC a charge against COMSAT alleging sexual harrassment and sexual
discrimination. 2' Ross filed a second charge with the EEOC on July 8, 1981,
alleging that COMSAT had committed several acts to retaliate against Ross
for filing the initial EEOC charge. 22
On or about August 18, 1981, Ross and at least one other employee
were discussing Ross' EEOC charge against COMSAT.2 3 When an employee
asked Ross what Ross would do if he lost his EEOC claim, Ross responded
that he might "blow the place up."' 24 Employees reported Ross' statement
to Ross' supervisor. 25 Subsequently, on August 24, 1981, COMSAT termi-
nated Ross' employment. 26 Following Ross' termination, Ross amended his
second EEOC charge to include a claim of retaliatory discharge. 27 The day
after his termination, Ross filed a claim for unemployment compensation
with the Maryland Employment Security Administration (ESA).28 Ross al-
leged in his ESA charges, along with allegations of harrassment and sexual
discrimination, that COMSAT discharged him in retaliation for filing a
16. Ross v. Communication Satellite Corp., 34 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAs. (BNA) 260, 261-
62 (D. Md. 1984). In Ross, Ross held the position of Materials Engineer in COMSAT's Materials
and Process Department. Id.
17. Id. In Ross, Ross, Penrose, and a third COMSAT employee car-pooled to a tennis
tournament in late January, 1981 and after the tournament, Penrose, the driver, dropped the
third employee at his apartment and returned Ross to his vehicle. Brief for Appellant at 6, Ross
v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1985); Brief for Appellee at 4, Ross
v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1985). Ross and Penrose spoke
briefly, following which Penrose said to Ross, "Tom, I think you and I should get to know
each other better." Brief for Appellant at 6; Brief for Appellee at 4.
18. Brief for Appellee, supra note 17, at 4.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 7.
21. Ross, 34 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAs. at 261.
22. Id. at 263. In Ross, Ross alleged that COMSAT had retaliated against him for filing
a charge with the EEOC by printing the details of his EEOC charge in the company newsletter,
by reducing his professional responsibility, by giving him unfavorable performance reviews, and
by informing prospective employers that Ross had filed charges with the EEOC. Id. at 265.
23. Brief for Appellee, supra note 17, at 11; Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 11-12.
24. Brief for Appellee, supra note 17, at 11; Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 11-12.
25. Brief for Appellee, supra note 17, at 11; Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 11-12.
26. Ross, 34 FAIR Emp'. PRAc. CAs. at 261.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 262.
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charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 29 Following an investigation, an
ESA Claims Examiner denied Ross' claim for unemployment compensation,
finding that COMSAT had discharged Ross for employee misconduct.30 Ross
appealed the decision of the Claims Examiner and on May 19, 1982 the ESA
Appeals Referee held a de novo hearing.3' On May 27, the Appeals Referee
presented his findings and ruled that COMSAT had discharged Ross for
misconduct.3 2 Ross appealed the Referee's decision to the ESA Board of
Appeals. 33 The ESA Board of Appeals denied Ross' petition. 34 Ross then
filed a timely appeal of the ESA Board's decision to deny review in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City.33 Following a hearing on September 20,
1983, the Circuit Court of Baltimore City affirmed the decision of the Board
of Appeals3 6 without issuing an opinion or making any findings of fact.
3 7
Ross did not appeal the decision of the Circuit Court of Baltimore."
While Ross' case with the Maryland ESA progressed on appeal, the
EEOC conducted an investigation of Ross's charges and, without making
any findings, issued a right-to-sue letter on January 5, 1982. 39 On March 3,
1982, between the time that the ESA Claims Examiner issued his decision
and the ESA Appeals Referee held the de novo hearing on Ross' unemploy-
ment claim, Ross filed his Title VII action in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland. 40 The district court found that the decision of
the ESA Board of Appeals, as affirmed by the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City, that Ross had been discharged for misconduct, precluded the district
court from finding that COMSAT discharged Ross in retaliation for Ross
filing charges with the EEOC.4' The district court held that since the ESA
proceedings afforded Ross an opportunity to present evidence in support of
his complaint and to rebut the evidence presented by COMSAT4 2 the ESA
29. Id. In Ross, COMSAT defended its termination of Ross. Id. COMSAT claimed that
Ross' work performance had deteriorated and that Ross had intimidated and harassed other
employees. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. According to the District Court in Ross, at the May 19, 1982 hearing before the
Maryland Employment Security Administration (ESA) Appeals Referee, counsel represented
both Ross and COMSAT, and both parties had an opportunity to examine and cross-examine
witnesses. Id.
32. Id. The Maryland Appeals Referee in the Ross ESA proceedings stated that the
evidence did not substantiate Ross' charges of sexual discrimination, but the Referee refused to




36. Ross, 34 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. at 263.
37. Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 13.
38. Ross, 34 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAs. at 263.
39. Id.; see supra note 4 and accompanying text (EEOC procedure in processing claim of
alleged employment discrimination).
40. Ross, 34 FAIR EMP. PRAc. CAs. at 264.
41. Id.
42. 8 MD. CODE ANN. art. 95A, § 7(g) (1985) (ESA Board of Appeals must conduct
hearing in such manner as to ascertain substantial rights of parties).
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proceedings satisfied the Due Process Clause and the doctrine of collateral
estoppel entitled the ESA's findings to preclusive effect in Ross' Title VII
claim. 43 The district court granted summary judgment for COMSAT.4
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit in Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp.
reversed the district court's decision that collateral estoppel precluded Ross'
litigation of the issues relating to his discharge. 45 Accordingly, the Ross court
remanded the case to the district court to reexamine whether the district
court should grant summary judgment based on applicable Title VII stand-
ards. 46 Unlike the district court, the Fourth Circuit held that the ESA
proceedings did not preclude the relitigation in federal court of Ross' claims
of retaliatory discharge. 47 The Fourth Circuit reached this decision after an
analysis, not only of the degree of similarity of the issue presented before
the Maryland ESA and the district court, but also of the statutes under
which the ESA and the district court considered the issue. 48 According to
the Ross court, the Maryland ESA, in deciding the reason for Ross' dis-
charge, determined whether COMSAT discharged Ross for work-related
misconduct 49 pursuant to the provisions of the Maryland Unemployment
Insurance Law.50 The district court, however, following the provisions of
Title VII, addressed the issue of whether COMSAT had discharged Ross
because Ross filed charges with the EEOC. 51 Since the Maryland Unemploy-
ment Insurance Law52 directs the factfinder's attention to an employee's
forbidden conduct and Title VIP3 directs the factfinder's attention to an
43. Ross, 34 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAs. at 264.
44. Id. at 266.
45. Ross, 759 F.2d at 357. When Ross appealed to the Fourth Circuit, Ross dropped his
claims of sexual discrimination and focused only COMSAT's alleged retaliatory harassment.
Id. at 359.
46. Id. at 363.
47. Id. at 360.
48. Id. at 360-62.
49. Id. at 362.
50. Id. at 362. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 95A, § 6(c) (1985). Section 6(c) of the Maryland
Unemployment Insurance Law provides that the Maryland Secretary of Employment and
Training (Secretary) shall disqualify a claimant seeking unemployment benefits for the week in
which the employer has discharged the claimant employee if the Secretary finds that the
discharge is the result of misconduct connected with the employee's work. Id. Section 6(c) also
provides that the employee's disqualification shall continue for a period of four to nine additional
weeks, depending upon the severity of the employee's misconduct. Id. The ESA Board of
Appeals defines "misconduct" for section 6(c) as an employee's violation of his employer's
policies or rules or a breach of a duty the employee owes his employer. Rogers v. Radio Shack,
271 Md. 126, 132, 314 A.2d 113, 117 (1974).
51. Ross, 759 F.2d at 362; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976). As the Ross court stated,
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any employee because an employee
has engaged in any activity protected by Title VII, such as Ross' filing charges with the EEOC.
Id.
52. MD. CODE ANN. art. 95A § 6(c). See supra note 50 (Maryland Unemployment
Insurance Law provides that employee shall not receive unemployment benefits for up to ten
weeks if employer discharges employee for misconduct).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). See supra note 51 (Title VII prohibits employer discrimination
for protected conduct).
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employer's forbidden motive, the Fourth Circuit held that although a court
might phrase the reason for Ross' discharge as an issue facially the same in
both the ESA and Title VII hearings, the dissimilarities in the ESA and Title
VII statutes destroyed the identity of the issue.5 4 The Ross court, therefore,
held that the dissimilarity in the ESA and Title VII statutes rendered
inapplicable the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
5
Because the Ross court found that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
was inapplicable in Ross' Title VII action, the Fourth Circuit in Ross held
that the district court committed reversible error when the district court
granted summary judgment based on the ESA findings. 6 The Fourth Circuit
then remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of the
propriety of summary judgment and for new trial, if necessary. 7 In denying
preclusive effect to the ESA hearings, however, the Ross court did not hold
that the findings of the ESA were irrelevant.5 8 The Fourth Circuit in Ross
recommended that the district court consider the ESA findings as evidence
in Ross' Title VII case.59 In remanding Ross, the Fourth Circuit directed the
district court's attention to the elements of a Title VII retaliatory firing
charge that tend to complicate a decision of whether to grant summary
judgment.60 The Ross court noted that when, as in Title VII claims of
54. Ross, 759 F.2d at 362. In addition to distinguishing the foci of the fact-finder's
attention, the Ross court drew other distinctions between the Maryland Unemployment Insurance
Law and Title VII such as the two laws' enforcement procedures and purposes. Compare 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) (Title VII enforced by federal courts) with MD. CODE ANN. art 95A §
7 (1985) (Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law enforced by Maryland ESA) compare Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (purpose of Title VII is to achieve equality of
employment opportunities) with MD. CODE ANN. art. 95A § 2 (1985) (purpose of Maryland
Unemployment Insurance Law is to benefit persons unemployed through no fault of their own).
55. Ross, 759 F.2d at 362.
56. Id. at 363. The Ross court recognized its ability to uphold the district court's summary
judgment if alternative grounds supporting summary judgment existed. Id. The Fourth Circuit
stated, however, that the number and complexity of the issues in Ross made affirmance of the
summary judgment improper. Id.; see Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 416
(4th Cir. 1979) (appellate court not bound on review to consider specific grounds upon which
district court based grant of summary judgment).
57. Ross, 759 F.2d at 364; see infra note 59 (directions of Fourth Circuit in Ross to
district court on propriety of summary judgment).
58. Ross, 759 F.2d at 363.
59. Id.
60. Ross, 759 F.2d at 363-365. The Ross court stated that in determining whether to grant
summary judgment, the district court first must examine whether any genuine issues of fact
exist, and second, whether such issues of fact are material. Id. at 364; see FED. R. Civ. PROC.
56(c) (1985) (summary judgment rendered forthwith if documents before court show no genuine
issue of material fact and that moving party is entitled to judgment). If a district court finds
that the moving party has met its burden of proof by showing the absence of any genuine issue
of material fact, the court must grant summary judgment. Ross, 759 F.2d at 364; FED. R. Cxv.
PROC. 56(c) (1985) (summary judgment proper in absence of genuine issue of material fact).
The Ross court stated that COMSAT, as the moving party, bore the burden of proving that no
genuine issue of fact existed. Ross, 759 F.2d at 364; see Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 157 (1970) (moving party has burden of proving absence of genuine issue of material
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retaliatory discharge, the state of mind or intent of either of the parties is a
decisive element of the claim or defense, a court must act cautiously in
granting summary judgment because of the strong probability that a jury
should resolve questions of intent.6 1 The Fourth Circuit also noted that
although motive often is the critical issue in a Title VII claim of retaliation,
an employee may not defeat an employer's motion for summary judgment
merely by alleging that the employer's motive violated Title VII.62 The court
stated that, as in any consideration of summary judgment, the party wishing
to defeat the motion-in this case the employee-must present sufficient
evidence of violative motive to support allegations of discriminatory or
retaliatory treatment and to create a genuine issue of material fact.6 3
In addition to demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of fact
concerning whether COMSAT's motive in discharging Ross violated Title
VII, Ross, according to the Fourth Circuit, also had to show that the issue
went to a material fact. 4 The Fourth Circuit then stated that Ross had to
show that "but for" Ross filing charges with the EEOC COMSAT would
not have harassed or discharged Ross.65 The Ross court chose the "but for"
fact). The Fourth Circuit also stated that the district court must view the facts, and the
inferences drawn from the facts, in a light most favorable to Ross, the nonmoving party. Ross,
759 F.2d at 364; see United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (nonmoving party in
summary judgment is entitled to benefit of doubt). The Ross court noted that the district court
should grant summary judgment only if the Ross case presented no issues for the court's
consideration and that, even if the district court properly could grant a directed verdict after
hearing the evidence, the district court should not try the case in advance by granting summary
judgment. Ross, 759 F.2d at 364; see Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910, 915 (4th Cir.)
(summary judgment proper only when no facts are in dispute), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887
(1951). The Ross court noted, however, that although COMSAT bore the burden of showing
the absence of genuine issues of material fact, and that the district court must view the evidence
in a light most favorable to Ross, Ross also was bound to present specific facts indicating the
presence of a genuine issue and could not rely solely on the speculative assertions of the
pleadings. Ross, 759 F.2d at 364; see First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.
253, 289 (1968) (party cannot rest on allegations of claim when opposing party has moved for
summary judgment).
61. Ross, 759 F.2d at 634; Charbonnages de France, 597 F.2d at 414 (summary judgment
is seldom appropriate in cases in which particular states of mind are decisive as elements of
claim or defense). In Ross, the Fourth Circuit stated that questions of intent, such as employer
motivation in Title VII cases of retaliatory discharge, often require a court to examine the
demeanor of live witnesses and that a summary judgment easily could eliminate such a crucial
determination of an employer's motivation. Ross, 759 F.2d at 364; see Morrison v. Nissan
Motor Co., Ltd., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1979) (determination of intent often depends on
witnesses' demeanor and credibility).
62. Ross, 759 F.2d at 364; see supra note 60 (discharged employee cannot rely solely on
speculative allegations in pleadings to raise genuine issue of material fact).
63. Ross, 759 F.2d at 364; see First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.
253, 288-89 (1968) (party wishing to show existence of issue must present evidence substantial
enough to persuade trier of fact of necessity of factual determination).
64. Ross, 759 F.2d at 364; see supra note 60 (court may not grant summary judgment
unless no genuine issue of material fact exists).
65. Ross, 759 F.2d at 364; see infra note 103 and accompanying text (Ross court's
adoption of "but for" standard of employer motivation in Title VII retaliatory discharge case).
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test of employer motivation over an "in part" test, rejecting the view that
an employer violates Title VII if retaliation for protected activity is merely
a partial reason for an employee's discharge. 66 The Ross court stated that it
chose the "but for" test because the "but for" test focuses the factfinder's
inquiry on the dominant reason for the employee's discharge, 67 the "but
for" test opens employees to normal sanctions for misconduct while pro-
tecting employees' Title VII rights,68 and provisions of Title VII other than
those proscribing retaliatory employer motivation also resolve violations by
the "but for" standard. 69
Since the Ross courts' choice of the "but for" standard was likely to
affect the district court's disposal of the retaliation issue on the summary
judgment motion, or alternatively, the district court's resolution of the
retaliation issue at trial,7 0 the Fourth Circuit also presented the sequence of
burdens of persuasion and production applicable to Title VII cases of
retaliation. 7 ' The court stated that in Title VII retaliation cases, the employee
first must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by a preponderance of
the evidence. 72 The employee's prima facie case consists of three elements.
73
66. Ross, 759 F.2d at 364; see infra text accompanying notes 102-104 (Ross court's
rejection of "in part" test of employer motivation in Title VII retaliatory discharge case).
67. Ross, 759 F.2d at 366.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 365.
70. Id. at 364; see United States v. Adamson, 665 F.2d 649, 656 n.19 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983). In United States v. Adamson, the Fifth Circuit held that
when an appellate court considers and decides an issue that parties have litigated and which
likely will arise on retrial, the appellate court's decision constitutes a holding, not dicta, even
though the appellate court may not need the decision to reverse the decision of the court below.
Adamson, 665 F.2d at 656 n.19.
71. Ross, 759 F.2d at 365. The Ross court adopted the sequence of burdens of proof and
production that the court used for Title VII retaliation cases from the sequence that the United
States Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, prescribed for Title VII disparate
treatment claims. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). The
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas established that the plaintiff in a Title VII trial must
carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of a Title VII violation. Id. at 802.
After the plaintiff has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has
violated the protection that Title VII affords employees, the defendant has the burden of
producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for taking the allegedly violative employment-
related action. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981). Should
the defendant produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for acting against the plaintiff,
the plaintiff must then offer further proof that the defendant's exculpatory explanation is
pretextual. Id. at 253. The Ross court stated that this sequence of burdens of proof and
production, although originally prescribed for Title VII discriminatory treatment cases, also
applies to Title VII retaliation cases. Ross, 759 F.2d at 365; see Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d
109, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (McDonnell Douglas sequence of burdens for Title VII discriminatory
treatment cases applies to Title VII retaliation cases); Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1296
(8th Cir. 1980) (applying sequence of burdens from disparate treatment cases to Title VII
retaliation cases), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981).
71. Ross, 759 F.2d at 364; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802-05.
72. Ross, 759 F.2d at 364.
73. Id.
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The employee must establish that the employee engaged in protected activity,
that the employer took adverse employment action against the employee,
and that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the
adverse action.7 4 The Fourth Circuit stated that by establishing the prima
facie case, the employee creates a presumption that the employer has violated
Title VII2 The court stated that the employer could then rebut the presumed
violation by producing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
action. 76 The Ross court, however, emphasized that the employer need not
actually prove conclusively a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation, so
long as the employer's explanation raises a genuine issue of fact.7 7 The court
stated that if the employer produced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory expla-
nation, the employee would have the additional burden or proving that the
employer's explanation is pretextua.
78
In holding that the district court erred in granting preclusive effect to
the prior ESA decision, the Fourth Circuit correctly decided that collateral
estoppel did not apply to preclude the relitigation in the district court of the
issue of whether COMSAT discharged Ross in retaliation for Ross' filing
charges with the EEOC. 79 In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,80 upon
which the Ross court relied, the United States Supreme Court established
that when a state court has upheld a state fair employment practice agency's
decision on an employment discrimination claim, a federal court, in a
subsequent Title VII action, must grant the same preclusive effect to the
state court decision as that state's own courts would grant .8 The Kremer
74. Id. at 365.
75. Id. at 364; see Womack, 619 F.2d at 1296 (plaintiff's prima facie case in Title VII
retaliation case creates inference that employer retaliated in violation of Title VII).
76. Ross, 759 F.2d at 365; see Womack, 619 F.2d at 1296 (employer must produce
evidence to dispel inference of retaliation by establishing existence of legitimate reason for
adverse action).
77. Ross, 759 F.2d at 365; see Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 252 (employer need only produce legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for adverse action
to rebut presumption of retaliation in Title VII case).
78. Ross, 759 F.2d at 365; see Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (employee must prove that
employer's profferred reason for discharge is pretextual); Womack, 619 F.2d at 1296 (overall
burden of persuasion remains with plaintiff employee in Title VII action).
79. See supra notes 50-52 (dissimilarity of Title VII and Maryland Unemployment
Insurance Law destroys identity of issues for collateral estoppel purposes.
80. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
81. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 478. In Kremer, the United States Supreme Court held that a
state court's decision to uphold a state agency's dismissal of an employment discrimination
claim precluded a subsequent federal action under Title VII. Id. at 485. Following his discharge
from Chemical Construction Corporation, Kremer, a Polish, Jewish immigrant, filed a complaint
with the EEOC alleging discrimination based on religion, age, and national origin. Id. at 463.
The EEOC referred the charge to the New York State Division of Human Rights (NYHRD).
Id. at 463-64; see supra note 4 and accoipanying text (discussing procedural aspects for filing
employment discrimination charges with EEOC). Following an investigation, the NYHRD found
no probable cause to believe that Chemical Construction had engaged in discriminatory practices.
456 U.S. at 464. The NYHRD Appeal Board upheld the agency decision. Id. Kremer filed for
a review of the Appeal Board's decision with the New York State Court of Appeals and refiled
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Court recognized that the decisions of state agencies empowered to address
claims of employment discrimination do not, absent affirmation by a state
court, preclude subsequent decisions by either the EEOC or the federal courts
in Title VII actions.8 2 The Supreme Court reasoned that since the statutory
provisions of Title VII empower the EEOC to review discrimination charges
previously rejected by state agencies and empower the federal courts to
enforce EEOC decisions,83 to allow the EEOC to review and reject the
findings of a state agency would be pointless if the federal courts were bound
to abide by the prior state agency decision.8 4 The Kremer Court held,
however, that when a state court has reviewed a state agency finding, federal
courts must grant full faith and credit to that state court's decision.85 If the
state's courts would grant preclusive effect to that state court's decision in a
his complaint with the EEOC. Id. The New York court upheld the order of the Appeal Board.
Id. The EEOC found Kremer's employment discrimination claim meritless and issued a right-
to-sue letter. Id. at 465. Kremer then brought a Title VII action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, which dismissed Kremer's complaint on grounds
of res judicata. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 587, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 467 n.6 (res judicata and collateral estoppel are related doctrines used
broadly to encompass both claim and issue preclusion). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss. Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir. 1980). On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
also affirmed. 456 U.S. 461. In affirming the dismissal of Kremer's Title VII action, the
Supreme Court stated that, in Title VII actions, when a state court has affirmed the decision
of a state employment discrimination agency, federal courts must grant the decision the same
preclusive effect that the state's courts would grant. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 478.
82. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 477-78; see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 50
(state fair employment practice laws are part of Title VII scheme but enforcement power
remains in federal courts).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f-g) (1976) (United States district court has power to enforce
provisions of Title VII).
84. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470 n.7. The Kremer Court noted that under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(0(1) EEOC decisions do not preclude a trial de novo in federal court. Id. The Kremer Court
held that Congress would not have established standards for EEOC examination of cases
subsequent to state proceedings if Congress intended to bar the federal courts from considering
such cases. Id. If Congress had intended such a limitation on the federal courts, the EEOC,
which lacks enforcement power, would be attempting to interpose between parties at variance
whom the state courts already protected from any further litigation. Batiste v. Furnco Constr.
Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 451 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975).
85. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 478; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). The res judicata principles codified
in § 1738 require federal courts to grant preclusive effect to prior state court decisions if the
state courts themselves would grant the prior decisions preclusive effect. Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90, 96 (1980). The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits have held that a federal court may not grant preclusive effect to a state court's review
of a state agency decision in a subsequent Title VII action. See Unger v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 914 (7th Cir. 1981) (foreclosure of Title VII judicial remedy would
discourage plaintiffs from fully pursuing state proceedings); Smouse v. General Electric Co.,
626 F.2d 333, 336 (3rd Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmance of
state Human Rights Commission decision is not res judicata in plaintiff's Title VII claim);
Gunther v. Iowa State Mens Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1084-85 (8th Cir.) (state proceedings
granted substantial evidentiary weight but not collateral estoppel effect in subsequent Title VII
action), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980). Prior to Kremer, the Fourth Circuit had adopted a
slightly narrower view in holding that parties cannot relitigate only the issues resolved in a de
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subsequent hearing, the federal courts also must grant preclusive effect to
that state court decision in a Title VII action.86
Applying the Kremer rule, the Fourth Circuit in Ross correctly held that
Maryland law would deny collateral estoppel effect to the judicially affirmed
ESA findings in a subsequent Title VII action.8 7 The Ross court relied upon
Cicala v. Disability Review Board for Prince George's County 8  as the
controlling Maryland law on the issue of whether a Maryland court would
grant a judicially affirmed state agency decision collateral estoppel effecting
a subsequent hearing before a different state agency. 9 The Cicala court
considered the issue of whether a Worker's Compensation Commission
(Commission) finding that a policeman's injury arose out of and in the
course of employment 9° was binding on a subsequent determination by the
Disability Review Board (Disability Board) concerning whether the police-
man's injury was service-connected. 9' The Cicala court held that the issue
novo state court proceeding, as opposed to issues resolved in administrative hearings, in a
subsequent Title VII action. Moosavi v. Fairfax County Bd. of Educ., 666 F.2d 58, 59 (4th
Cir. 1981) (determination of discrimination issue by state court of competent jurisdiction
precludes subsequent relitigation of discrimination issue in Title VII action).
86. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468-76. The Kremer Court found no express or implied repeal
of § 1738 in any of the provisions of Title VII and therefore declined to find any exception to
the full faith and credit provisions of § 1738. Id. Consequently, the Kremer Court held that a
federal court must grant preclusive effect when a state court would do so. Id.
87. Ross, 759 F.2d at 363. The Ross Court noted that the district court failed to include
any reference to Maryland law in its opinion. Id.
88. 288 Md. 254, 418 A.2d 205 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980).
89. Cicala v. Disability Review Bd. for Prince George's County, 288 Md. at 263, 418
A.2d at 211. In Cicala, a Prince George's County, Maryland, policeman, John Cicala, suffered
accidental injuries: Id. at 258, 418 A.2d at 208. The Maryland Workmen's Compensation
Commission found that Cicala's injuries arose in the course of Cicala's employment. Id. at
258, 418 A.2d at 208; see MD. CODE ANN. art. 100, § 15 (1985) (employer shall provide
employee compensation for disability resulting from injury arising out of and in course of
employment). Cicala later applied to the Disability Review Board for service-connected disability
retirement benefits based on the same injury for which Cicala received workmen's compensation
benefits. Cicala, 288 Md. at 258, 418 A.2d at 208; see PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY (MD.) CODE
§ 16-231 (1975) (statutory authorization for Prince George's County Police Pension Plan);
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY (MD.) POLICE PENSION PLAN §§ 4.3(a) & 4.3(c)(1) (1975) (providing
enhanced retirement benefits for disability caused by injury suffered as result of employee's
performance of duties). In the Disability Review Board hearing, Cicala asserted that the
principles of res judicata applied and that the determination by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission that Cicala's injury arose "out of and in the course of employment" was conclusive
with respect to the issue of whether Cicala's disability was the "result of [Cicala's] performance
of his duties." Cicala, 288 Md. at 263, 418 A.2d at 211. The Disability Review Board disagreed.
Id. at 258, 418 A.2d at 208. Cicala appealed to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County,
which affirmed the Disability Review Board's decision that res judicata did not apply. Id. at
258, 418 A.2d at 208. Cicala then appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which
also affirmed the Board's decision. Id. at 258, 418 A.2d at 208.
90. Cicala, 288 Md. at 263, 418 A.2d at 211; see MD. CODE ANN. art. 100, § 15 (1985)
(employer shall provide employee compensation for disability resulting from injury arising out
of and in the course of employment).
91. Cicala, 288 Md. at 263, 418 A.2d at 211; see PRINCE GEORGE'S CoUNTY (MD.) POLICE
PENSION PLAN § 4.3(c)(1) (1975) (disability defined as injury suffered as result of employee's
performance of duties).
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that the Commission had decided carried no preclusive effect in the Disability
Board hearing. 92 The Cicala court stated that underlying the rationale for its
decision was the dissimilarity between the legislative histories, purposes,
scopes of coverage, language, standards, procedures, and policies of the
Worker's Compensation statute and the Disability Review Board Pension
Plan statute. 93 Although the Cicala court pointed out the similarity in the
issues presented to both the Commission and the Disability Board, the court
held that the dissimilarity of the statutes guiding each agency would yield
differing results in the agencies' determinations of fact.94 The Cicala court
held, therefore, that the likely differences in issue resolution destroyed the
identity of the issues for res judicata purposes. 9
Although the Kremer decision directed the Fourth Circuit in Ross to
examine whether Maryland law would require a Maryland court to grant
preclusive effect to a prior Maryland Court's affirmance of an agency
decision, and Cicala addressed the issue of whether one agency should grant
preclusive effect to a different agency's decision, 96 the Fourth Circuit correctly
relied on Cicala as the controlling Maryland law. 97 Although in Cicala a
92. Cicala, 288 Md. at 263, 418 A.2d at 211. Although the Cicala court used "res
judicata" to refer to the preclusion of the issue that Cicala claimed the Workmen's Compen-
sation Commission had concluded, the Ross court categorized the principles to which the Cicala
court referred as those of collateral estoppel rather than those of res judicata. Ross, 759 F.2d
at 362 n.8.
93. Cicala, 288 Md. at 263, 418 A.2d at 211.
94. Cicala, 288 Md. at 266-267, 418 A.2d at 213. The Cicala court noted that even the
seemingly minor procedural differences between the Workmen's Compensation Act guiding the
Workmen's Compensation Commission and the Police Pension Plan guiding the Disability
Review Board could have substantial impact because the differences could result in the
presentation of different facts upon which the Workmen's Compensation Commission and the
Disability Review Board would base their respective decisions. Id.; see Tipler v. E. I. duPont
de Nemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1971). In Tipler v. E. L duPont deNemours &
Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that an NLRB decision that
racial prejudice did not motivate an employer's discharge of a minority employee did not
preclude litigation of the discrimination issue in a Title VII action. Id. The Sixth Circuit in
Tipler based its rationale on the dissimilarity of the National Labor Relations Act and Title
VII. Id.; see Gee v. Celebrezze, 355 F.2d 849, 850 (7th Cir. 1966) (Social Security Administration
not bound by agency determinations made under standards different from those applicable to
Social Security determination of disability). Lane v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 185 F.2d 819,
822 (6th Cir. 1950) (Railroad Retirement Board not bound by decision of National Railroad
Adjustment Board because of difference in statute prescribing determination of employee
disability).
95. Cicala, 288 Md. at 267, 418 A.2d at 213.
96. Compare id., 288 Md. at 267, 418 A.2d at 213 (judicially unreviewed Workmen's
Compensation Commission decision not afforded preclusive effect in Disability Review Board
decision) with Kremer, 456 U.S. at 478 (judicially affirmed state fair employment practice
agency decision preclusive with respect to subsequent Title VII fair employment practice claim);
see supra note 92 (collateral estoppel and res judicata are related doctrines).
97. See supra notes 81-84 & 96 (discussing Kremer rule of res judicata effect of judicially
affirmed state agency decision on subsequent Title VII action and comparing Kremer with
Cicala decision on interagency collateral estoppel issue); see also supra note 92 (collateral
estoppel and res judicata are related doctrines).
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Maryland state court never affirmed the Workmen's Compensation Com-
mission's decision, the Fourth Circuit was correct in relying on Cicala as
governing Maryland law. 98 The Cicala court's rationale in denying preclusive
effect to the issue decided by the Commission rested on the statutory
dissimilarity between the Commission and the Disability Board.99 Neither
judicial affirmance nor reversal of the Commission's decision would alter
the statutory dissimilarity.' °0 Therefore, the denial of collateral estoppel in
Cicala and in similar interagency situations functions independently of
judicial affirmance or reversal of the prior agency decision.'0' The Ross
court, therefore, correctly applied Maryland law as Kremer requires. 02
Moving from a consideration of applicable state law to a consideration
of the applicable standard for determining a causal connection between an
employer's motivation and an employer's discharge of an employee, the
Fourth Circuit correctly chose the "but for" standard over the "in part"
standard in Title VII retaliation cases. 0 3 The "but for" test, as the Ross
98. See supra note 96 (comparing Cicala with Kremer).
99. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text ( Cicala court holding that applicability
of collateral estoppel depends not only on identity of issues in prior and subsequent hearings
but substantial similarity of statutes that guide consideration of issues); see also 2 DAvis,
ADMIN. LAW TREATiSE § 18.04 at 577-78 (1958). Courts must take into account the context of
the statute by which the administrative agency determines an issue in determining whether
collateral estoppel applies to preclude relitigation of a facially identical issue in a subsequent
agency proceeding. Davis, supra at 577-78. A variation in purpose, scope, and procedure
between two statutes alters the form of the issues' consideration between two different agency
hearings and so renders collateral estoppel inapplicable. Id. Collateral estoppel and res judicata
are both "soft" rules. Id. at 548. Courts will qualify or reject "soft" rules when their application
would contravene an overriding public policy or result in manifest injustice. Id.; see United
States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 464 U.S. 165, 180 (1984) (White, J., concurring) (refusal of
preclusion justified if effect of applying preclusion is to give prior litigant favored position
solely because prior litigant has asserted issue and prevailed).
100. See supra note 99 (collateral estoppel based on statutory dissimilarity functions
independently of judicial consideration).
101. See supra, text accompanying note 100 (statutory dissimilarity exists independently of
judicial consideration).
102. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (Ross courts' application of Cicala
correct despite variation in facts between Cicala and Kremer).
103. Ross, 759 F.2d at 366. The Ross court noted correctly that most of the other United
States Circuit Courts of Appeal favor the "but for" standard as the test of employer motivation
in retaliatory discharge cases under Title VII. Id. The Fifth Circuit has adopted firmly the "but
for" standard for "mixed motive" discharges when legally protected activity is involved.
McMillan v. Rust College, Inc., 710 F.2d 1112,, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983); DeAnda v. St. Joseph
Hosp., 671 F.2d 850, 856 (5th Cir. 1982); Smalley v. City of Eatonville, 640 F.2d 765, 769 (th
Cir. 1981); accord McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 728 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Title VII plaintiff may make "but for" showing directly by persuading court that protected
activity most likely motivated employer or indirectly by showing employer's profferred expla-
nation is pretextual); Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1982) (Title VII
plaintiff must show by preponderance of evidence that but for engaging in protected activity
employer would not have discharged plaintiff). Williams, 663 F.2d at 117 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(employer must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that employee would have lost
job absent retaliatory employer motive); Womack, 619 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1980) (employee's
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court correctly noted, tightly focuses the factfinders' attention on the pre-
vailing reason for the employee's discharge while safeguarding the employee's
legal right to protest perceived discrimination.' 4 Since an "in part" test of
employer motivation might insulate an employee from adverse action not-
withstanding the employee's misconduct, the Ross court correctly held the
the "but for" test allows an employee to exercise the rights established in
Title VII while not sanctioning conduct unprotected by Title VII. 0 5 Only the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has applied an "in
part" test of employer motivation, and in that case, Cohen v. Fred Meyer,
Inc.,106 the Ninth Circuit relied upon precedent calling for a "but for" test
of employer motivation.1 7 The Ninth Circuit in Cohen did not address any
discharge would not have occurred in absence of employee's Title VII suit against employer);
Montiero v. Poole Silver Co., 615 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1980) (employer motive in retaliation for
employee opposition to discrimination must be determinative factor in discharge decision).
104. Ross, 759 F.2d at 366. The United States Supreme Court has expressed a preference,
in areas of constitutional law, for tests of causation that distinguish between a result caused by
a constitutional violation and a result caused by a legitimate nonviolative means. Mt. Healthy
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977). In Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, the
Supreme Court held that the proper test to apply in a case of employer retaliation for
constitutionally protected first amendment activity properly would protect against the invasion
of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable consequences not necessary to the
assurance of the protected rights. Id. at 287. The Mt. Healthy Court held that when an employee
alleges that an employer failed to rehire the employee because of the employee's exercise of
protected rights, the employee must show that but for his protected activity the employer would
have rehired him. Id. Under Mt. Healthy, an employer may avoid a constitutional violation by
showing that he would have taken adverse action in the absence of protected activity. Id. As
an example of pretext, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court stated that
when employees of different races engage in misconduct and the employer discharges only the
members of one race, the misconduct likely is a pretext for the discharge. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 804. The Supreme Court in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co. stated that the use in McDonnell Douglas of the term "pretext" does not
mean that the Title VII plaintiff must show that, regardless of any misconduct, his employer
eventually would have discharged him because of his race. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976). Instead, the employee must show only that, in the context
of misconduct, his race was the "but for" cause of his discharge. Id.
105. Ross, 759 F.2d at 366; see Williams, 663 F.2d at 116-17 (Congress designed Title VII
to protect employee rights but not to shield employee from normal sanctions for work-related
misconduct or flaws).
106. 686 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1982).
107. Id. at 798. In Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit relied on Womack v. Munson and Montiero v. Poole Silver Co. in requiring a
Title VII plaintiff to prove that her employer acted, "at least in part," with a retaliatory intent
or motive. Id.; see Womack, 619 F.2d at 1297 (employee must show that "but for" protected
activity employer would not have taken adverse action); Montiero, 615 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1980)
(employee must prove that employer would not have taken adverse action in absence of
protected activity). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Bibbs v.
Block, adopted a test of employer motivation that is similar to the "in part" test mentioned in
Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc. Bibbs v. Block, 749 F.2d 508, 511-13 (1984). In Bibbs, the Eighth
Circuit held that when an employee shows that racial discrimination more likely than not
motivated thi employer in the employer's decision to discharge the employee, then the employee
establishes the employer's liability under Title VII. Bibbs, 749 F.2d at 511-12. The Eighth
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policy considerations that would render the "in part" test superior to the
"but for" test and handed down a decision in conflict with another Ninth
Circuit case decided the same year, Kaufman v. Sidereal Corp.08 The
Kaufman court held that courts could best determine employer motivation
in a Title VII case of retaliatory discharge using a "but for" standard.' °9
The Fourth Circuit, in Ross, addressed and resolved the conflict now
facing the Ninth Circuit by firmly adopting the "but for" standard of
employer motivation in Title VII cases of retaliatory discharge." 0 Fourth
Circuit practitioners should note that the "but for" test comes into play at
the third stage of the analysis,"' when the employee attempts to disprove
the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the employee's
discharge."12 Absent some direct evidence that the employer discharged the
employee solely for engaging in protected activity,' two alternative methods
generally suffice to show "but for" causation. The first method requires the
plaintiff to show that Title VII protected the plaintiff or the plaintiff's
activity, that the plaintiff and other employees engaged in the activity that
the employer claims is the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
plaintiff's discharge, and that the employer discharged only the plaintiff for
Circuit then stated that once the employee shows race to be a discernible factor motivating the
employee's discharge, the relative weight of the employer's discriminatory motivations for
discharging the employee were not only incalculable but irrelevant to a Title VII analysis of a
discharge. Id. The Bibbs court further stated that a "but for" analysis was inherently inconsistent
because the "but for" test allows for the presence of discernible racial discrimination in an
employer's decision to terminate an employee, but permits that decision if the decision would
have occurred in the absence of racial discrimination. Id. at 512. The inconsistency of the "but
for" test, according to the Bibbs court, is that once discernible racial discrimination becomes
apparent in an employer's decision on an employee's hiring or tenure, racial considerations
affect the outcome of an employer's decision. Id. The Bibbs test, because it eliminates the "but
for" measurement of the weight of an employer's impermissible motives, facilitates the
determination of whether an employer has violated Title VII. Id. The Bibbs test, however,
ignores the possibility that an employer may rely on more objective criteria than race, sex, or
national origin in making employment decisions. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropol-
itan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (rarely does one single dominant or primary
concern motivate decisions).
108. 695 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1982).
109. Id. at 345. The Kauffman court relied for its application of a "6 ut for" standard on
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. and De Anda v. St. Joseph Hospital. Id.; see
McDonald, 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) (employee in Title VII action must show racial
discrimination is sole reason for discharge); De Anda v. St. Joseph Hosp., 671 F.2d 850, 857
n.12 (5th Cir. 1982) ("but for" analysis allows plaintiff in mixed motive case to prove that
impermissible motive was determinative factor in adverse action).
110. Ross, 759 F.2d at 366.
111. See supra note 71 (sequence of burdens of proof and production established by
Burdine and applied to Title VII retaliation cases by Ross).
112. Id.
113. See Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 918 (1981). The Unger court
held that employers who, upon learning of the plaintiff employee's employment discrimination
charge, called and harassed the plaintiff and urged her to drop the charge, and who immediately
terminated the plaintiff upon her refusal to drop the charge, presented overwhelming evidence
of retaliatory motive. Id.
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this allegedly nondiscriminatory reason." 4 The second method of proving
"but for" causation when direct evidence of employer motivation is not
available depends not upon a showing of disparate treatment of the plaintiff
as compared to other employees but rather upon a change over time in the
employer's treatment of the plaintiff.' 5 Under the second method, the
plaintiff must show that the plaintiff engaged in the activity that the employer
claims is the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's dis-
charge, but that the employer discharged the plaintiff only after the plaintiff
engaged in protected Title VII activity.11 6 Under the second method, the
discharge must follow closely on the heels of the protected activity. 1 7 Under
either method, however, the employer still may legitimize the discharge if
the employer can show that the discharge would have occurred even in the
absence of the protected activity."'
The Ross decision also intimates that Fourth Circuit practitioners should
pay particular attention to prevailing state law when seeking to preclude in
a Title VII trial the relitigation of issues that a state court previously had
considered.' 9 A practitioner's analysis of state law should examine first the
individual state's doctrine with respect to collateral estoppel. 20 If the prac-
titioner seeks to preclude issues arising from the hearing of an agency not
empowered to address employment discrimination, the practitioner should
examine whether the state's collateral estoppel doctrine recognizes the concept
that a substantial dissimilarity between the statutes under which agencies
consider an issue destroys the identity of the issue for purposes of collateral
estoppel.' 2' If state law is silent on the subject, as is true in most Fourth
114. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. at 283. The McDonald court
established that, while an employer may decide that certain conduct will render an employee
unfit for employment, an employer violates Title VII if the employer excuses that conduct in
some employees and condemns the conduct in others, if the employer bases such condem-
nation on an element that Title VII protects. Id.
115. See Womack, 619 F.2d at 1296. The Womack court held that discharge soon after
the employer learns of the employee's protected activity justifies an inference of retaliatory
motive. Id.
116. Id. at 1296 n.6.
117. Id.
118. See Montiero v. Poole Silver, 615 F.2d at 9 (employer may produce legitimate
nondiscriminatory explanation to show that employer would have discharged employee in
absence of protected activity).
119. See supra note 86 (discussing application of full faith and credit to judicially affirmed
state agency decisions).
120. See, e.g., Monongahela Power Co. v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 200, 202 (W. Va. 1985)
(collateral estoppel requires first judgment to be rendered on merits by court of competent
jurisdiction); Tar Landing Villas Owners' Ass'n v. Atlantic Beach, 64 N.C. App. 239, 244 307
S.E.2d 181, 185 (N.C. App. 1983) (policy supporting collateral estoppel is not so unyielding
that courts invariably must apply collateral estoppel); Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 671, 202
S.E.2d 917, 921-922 (1974) (collateral estoppel applies to preclusion of issues but not causes of
action).
121. See DAvis, ADM1ISTRATIVE LAW TREATIsE § 18.04 at 577-78 (1958) (determination
of issue not necessarily preclusive when same question arises under identical words of another
statute). Of the states within the Fourth Circuit, only Maryland explicitly has followed Professor
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Circuit states,' the practitioner who seeks to preclude relitigation of an
issue may argue that an agency's binding, prior determination of an issue
best serves the public policies furthered by the doctrine of collateral estoppel:
relieving parties of the costs and vexations of multiple lawsuits, conserving
judicial resources, and encouraging reliance on adjudications. 2  A practi-
tioner who seeks to avoid the use of collateral estoppel may argue that the
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel would contravene an
overriding public policy or result in manifest injustice.
24
In Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., the Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court's holding that a prior Maryland Employment Security
Administration decisions precluded relitigation of the issue of employer
motivation in a Title VII action.' 2 Adhering to the principle that federal
courts must apply state law to determine whether to grant collateral estoppel
effect in Title VII cases to judicially affirmed, prior state agency decisions,
26
the Ross court found that Maryland law did not give collateral estoppel
effect to a Maryland ESA decision in a subsequent Title VII action. 27 The
Fourth Circuit's holding in Ross decreases the probability that federal courts
will afford preclusive effect to state agency decisions that rest on statutes
substantially dissimilar from those that guide the federal courts' consideration
of issues under Title VII.128 The Fourth Circuit's decision in Ross also
Davis' approach to interagency issue preclusion. See Cicala, 418 A.2d at 211-12 (quoting Davis
on collateral estoppel effect of prior agency decision); see supra note 99 (discussing Davis'
approach to interagency issue preclusion).
122. See supra note 121 (only Maryland explicitly has followed Davis' "dissimilarity of
statute" approach to interagency issue preclusion); cf. Shrewsbury v. State Workmen's Com-
pensation Comm'r, 187 S.E.2d 597 (Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. 1972). In Shrewsbury v. State
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held a
final decision by the West Virginia Silicosis Medical Board, denying benefits to plaintiff, was
not preclusive with respect to subsequent claim for workmen's compensation benefits for an
occupational disease other than silicosis. Id. The Shrewsbury court gave no preclusive effect to
the prior decision because silicosis under the applicable statute was a separate occupational
disease from the disease for which the plaintiff sought workmen's compensation benefits. Id.
123. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 467; Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); see Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402 (1940) (dissimilarity between first and second
agencies' decisions not necessarily crucial if underlying issue remains nominally the same in
subsequent hearing).
124. See Title v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 322 F.2d 21, 23-24 (9th Cir. 1963)
(courts should relax or qualify doctrine of collateral estoppel to suit needs of case); see supra
note 99 and accompanying text (collateral estoppel is "soft" rule); see also supra note 1
(Congress did not intend to screen from EEOC those civil rights problems that state authorities
could not settle).
125. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussing Ross court's analysis of
applicability of collateral estoppel under controlling Maryland law).
126. See supra notes 12-13, 81-86 (discussing Kremer rule of preclusive effect in Title VII
action of prior state agency decision).
127. See supra notes 88-95 (discussing Maryland law of interagency issue preclusion).
128. See supra notes 94, 98-101 (discussing precedential and policy arguments against
extensive application of collateral estoppel to non-fair-employment-practice agency decisions in
subsequent Title VII actions).
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